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Identification']and Measurement of Inefficiencies 
In Leasing Systems l 
(An Application of Linear ProgralTIlTIing) 
BY MICHELE DE BENEDICTIS AND JOHN F. TIMMONS2 
This study is directed toward developing pro-
cedures for identifying, measuring and appraising 
intratemporal dissociations between benefits and 
costs on rented farms. Development of these 
procedures is expected to provide further insight 
into the resource structure and operation of a 
firm in which multiple interests are present. 
Recent studies appear to have achieved a 
satisfactory agreement in defining the functions 
of a lease, thus providing a common starting point 
for economic analysis.3 Chryst and Timmons have 
summarizd the purposes of farm rent; 
1. It helps allocate resources among particular 
kinds and amounts of uses in the productive 
process. 
2. It distributes returns between landlord and 
tenant from the joint use of their combined re-
sources. . 
3. It helps to keep landlords and tenants work-
ing together as teams, which is necessary in the 
continued joint use of their combined resources.4 
This interpretation of a farm lease provides a 
useful frame of reference for analyzing leasing 
problems. It is possible to measure deviations, 
whether induced by institutions or other causes, 
from optimum attainment of the functions of the 
lease. 
Surveys made to detect criteria motivating 
behavior of landlords and tenants have suggested 
an acceptance of these functions of the lease.5 
PROBLEMS GENERATED BY INTRAFIRM MULTIPLE 
INTERESTS 
In traditional economic theory, the firm is con-
ceived of as the effective decision-making unit in 
1 Project 1043. Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment 
Station. 
2 Formerly research nssistant. Iowa State University. now profeosor 
of economics. University of Nnples; and profesoor of economics. Iowa 
State University; respectively. 
• Heady E. O. Economics of ngricultural production and resource 
use. Prentice.Hall. New York. 1952. Chryst. W. E. and Timmons. 
J F. Adjusting farm rents to changes In prices. costs and production. 
I~wa Agr. Exp. Sta. Special Report No.9. 1955. 
• Chryst and Timmons. ibid. p. 7. 
• Timmons J. F. Improving farm rental arrangements in Iowa. Iowa 
Agr. Exp. ·Sta. Res. Bul. 393. 1953. 
whatever production activity is considered. To 
this definition of a firm, economic analysis has 
traditionally added a set of collateral character-
istics in terms of which the theory of the firm 
has been formulated. Particularly relevant to 
this study is the assumed perfect association be-
tween input contributor and return receiver with-
in the firm, to the effect that, under certain 
conditions, the resource owner receives the mar-
ginal value product of the resource he contributes.o 
This association is attained by assuming the 
existence of an entrepreneur in whose hands are 
centralized the power, responsibility and con-
sequences of decision-making. He owns or hires 
factors of production, and he acts to attain a 
position of profit maximization for the firm as a 
whole.7 
The assumption of the traditional theory, by 
which benefits and costs are perfectly associated 
i~ th~ hands qf the entreprene~r, would be justi-
fled m farms operated by theIr owners.s This, 
of course makes allowances for interspatial and 
intertempol'al dissociations of costs and benefits.1I 
The owner-operator, under those conditions could 
attain an optimum allocation of resources to 
maximize his profits.10 For a rented farm how-
ever, the situation is very different. Sin'ce re-
sources are furnished .separately by landowner 
and tenant and since the decision-making process 
G The residual imputational procedures for resource valuation aeaume 
(1) the market value of each resource is equal to its marginal value 
product. and (2) the firm is operating under constant return. to seale. 
'This is the concept developed by J. R. Hicks. Value and capital. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1941. p. 86. 
S Ibid .. Ch. 6. Hicks states the necessary conditions to maximize profits 
aB follows: 
a. The price-ratio between two products must equal the marginal 
rate of substitution between the two products. 
b. The price-ratio hetween any two factors must equal their mar-
ginal rate of substitution. 
c. The price-ratio between any factor and any product must equal 
the marginal rate of transConnation between the factor and the 
product. 
Besides these necessary conditions. Hicks adds two stability conditions 
which are: a diminishing marginal rate of transfonnation for the 
factor-product and the factor-factor relationships and an increasing 
marginal rate of substitution for the product-product relationsbip. 
Supposing that the farmer's capital availability is limited, which Is 
the ordinary case. then if the first two necessary conditions hold-
conditions a and b-the marginal unit of each factor or service applied 
to different uses obtains the same rate of returns within the multiple-
product agricultural firm. 
• For further elaboration. see: Timmons. J. F. Economic framework 
for watershed development. Jour. Farm Econ. 46:1178. 1954. 
,. Assuming single-valued expectations. 
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is not united in a single entrepreneur but is 
variably split between the resource contributors, 
the theoretical conditions for profit maximization 
may not be attained. In effect, at the time when 
an agreement on the initial contributions of 
resources is made, the division of returns also is 
stipulated. This agreement may vary from al-
most complete abstention of the landlord regard-
ing decision-making (cash lease), to an inter-
mediate combination of mutual decision-making 
(crop-share lease), to a form of cooperative 
decision-making by both parties (certain livestock 
shares).l1 The division of decision-making within 
the firm engenders conflicts of interests between 
the two parties involved and may produce resource 
misallocations which are directly attributable to 
leasing arrangements. 
Even though this study places major emphasis 
upon potential inefficiencies inherent in the ex-
istence of multiple interests within the firm, it 
is necessary to point out that several economic 
advantages may be attained by individuals through 
leasing. For instance, severe capital limitations 
of an endogenous nature can be relaxed through 
leasing. Capital limitations might induce the 
entrepreneur to plan over short periods, because 
survival of the firm becomes basic for continued 
farm operation. A landlord with a fixed amount 
of land and scarce operating capital may achieve 
an optimum amount of resource quantity through 
combination with a tenant, labor and capital. 
Conversely, the capital which would be used by a 
tenant for purchase of land is used for acquiring 
other productive resources. 
In the area of endogenous capital limitation, 
the presence of the "principle of increasing risk" 
suggests that the size of production unit might 
be larger under renting than under proprietor-
ship. In fact, the risks associated with a larger 
outlay may be spread under certain types of 
leases, particularly share leases. 
Finally, sharing of uncertainties connected with 
yields and prices may be an incentive to expand 
the size of the firm. The existence of larger 
farms in acres under share leases may be partly 
explained by the increased propensity for sharing 
UI.certainties. 
THE PROBLEM DELIMITED FOR THIS STUDY 
After the initial interest by early economists 
in the problems raised by rental contracts, re-
search became oriented toward investigations 
largely descriptive in nature. Extensive surveys 
on the proportions of the various forms of leases 
and shares of contributions and products, mainly 
in the attempt to identify leasing customs, were 
carried out. More recently, however, emphasis 
has turned toward studies and investigations of 
a more analytical nature. 
The trend of recent research seems to have 
"This division is based on types of leases most common in the Mid-
west: however. they reflect general categories of leases present elsewhere. 
For a further diocusslon of Ie..... characteristics, see: Hurlburt, V. L. 
Farm rental practices and problems in the Midwest. Iowa Agr, Exp. 
St., Res. Bu!. 416. 1954. 
40 
followed two main routes: (1) exploration of the 
theory of the firm under situations with split 
ownership of resources and (2) empirical analysis 
of the existing leasing arrangements to identify 
lack of fulfillment of optimum conditions in cer-
tain areas12 at specific points of time and to 
compare productivities of resources between al-
ternative tenure arrangements,13 Less stress has 
been laid upon the empirical isolation for indi-
vidual farms of eventual deviations from postu-
lated incentive conditions. The techniques most 
often employed are descriptive analysis, produc-
tivity analysis using single equation models and, 
more recently, linear programming. 
Within the context of earlier research, this 
study is specifically concerned with (1) the im-
pact of the intratemporal dissociation between 
benefits and costs on resource allocation and in-
come distribution in a typical crop-share-cash 
lease, (2) an analysis of the impact of alternative 
leasing arrangements on the initial collection of 
resources and (3) an analysis of the effect of re-
laxing some resource restrictions on optimum 
farm plans. Linear programming is the analytical 
tool used, and the analysis of the initial situation 
is carried out for the period 1951-55,14 
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
This study has the general objective of develop-
ing methods for empirically testing hypotheses 
which have been presented theoretically in the 
literature. Further hypotheses, advanced in the 
following chapter, are also tested. 
In the light of this general objective, the specific 
objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To isolate and identify leasing-engendered 
imperfections through intrafirm analysis of re-
source allocation. The emphasis is essentially 
methodological, since the primary goal is to devise 
an analytical procedure or to adapt available 
analytical tools to detect and measure tenure im-
pacts on resource allocation within the firm. 
Within this general area, and on the basis of 
the methodology developed, the following specific 
objectives are pursued: (a) to point out basic 
bargaining conflicts between landlord and tenant 
under typical resource restrictions; (b) to evalu-
ate the impact on resource allocation generated 
by alternative leasing arrangements and alterna-
tive resource restrictions. 
2. To draw preliminary conclusions on the types 
of adjustments needed in farm leases and rented 
farms, both with respect to types of leases, given 
certain resource restrictions, and levels of resource 
combination, given certain leasing arrangements. 
THE PLAN OF THIS REPORT 
This study has four major parts: (1) develop-
"See Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bula. 386, 393, 416. 425. 426. 445 
and Special Report No.9. 
l3 See Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Buls. 433 and 461. 
.. Only the eventual deviations induced by intratemporal dlssocl"tions 
are taken into consideration. Inte.-temporal dissociations. problll,ns of 
long-term combinations of landlord and tenant reBources and effects 
of prices. cost and yield variations on stability of leases are r~"ognl~ed 
but are outside the objectives of this study. 
ment of a theoretical framework for appraisal of 
resource use in rental arrangements, (2) adap-
tation of linear programming procedure to the 
analysis of tenancy problematic situations, (3) 
application of this analytical model to selected 
resource and lease situations with results and 
their interpretation and (4) suggestions for 
further research in the extension and use of the 
methods presented. 
The theoretical framework is a synthesis and 
reorganization of relevant concepts advanced in 
current literature on leasing theory. It provides 
the elements necessary for the formulation of 
hypotheses to be tested in following sections in 
which linear programming is employed as an 
analytical tool to identify and measure lease-
engendered imperfections. 
The approach differs from previous studies in 
the general area of land tenure and production 
economics in two main respects. First, this study 
endeavors to determine, in addition to the opti-
mum positions for the two parties, the feasible 
intermediary positions between the two optima, 
pointing out the possibility of alternative farm 
plans within a given lease. Second, instead of 
considering discrete changes in landlord and tenant 
capital restrictions, the modification of the linear 
programming simplex solution is used, which 
allows for continuous variation in the operating 
capital. The methods developed are applied to a 
typical lease and rented farm in north-central 
Iowa. Varying lease and resource situations are 
also analyzed. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF 
LEASING PROBLEMS 
In the traditional approach, the firm is assumed 
to be operating in perfectly competitive markets 
for both products and factors. The entrepreneur 
makes decisions, bears the costs and receives the 
returns. Traditionally, this type of firm has be-
come the operational norm from which deviations 
are measured. 
The economic setting within which any lease is 
assumed to function is characterized by the follow-
ing conditions: (1) competition (abstracting from 
the imperfections inherent in the lease) and 
private ownership of resources prevail and (2) 
the existing price system provides the measure 
for efficiency in resource allocation. 
The amount of variability between rental agree-
ments is considerable. Each farm situation is 
unique. To draw conclusions and recommendations 
of general validity, it becomes helpful to use the 
theoretically perfect lease as a point of departure 
for an analysis. A perfect lease, as a leasing 
goal, should bring about the most efficient al-
location of l'esources. The test of a leasing ar-
rangement with respect to its efficiency is whether 
it allows fulfillment of the conditions necessary 
for the maximization of profits by the individual 
firm. The leasing system thus becomes inefficient 
if it hinders allocation of resources in the achieve-
ment of these conditions: (1) a combination of 
enterprises which will equate the marginal returns 
of re.sou~ces employed in each enteI1!rise, (2) 
substItutIon of factors such that the ratIo of their 
marginal productivities is equal to the ratio of 
their prices, (3) combination of variable with 
fixed resources such that marginal returns and 
costs for the former are equated and (4) an over-
all scale of operations which equates marginal 
costs and returns at a level consistent with the 
cost-price relationships and normal uncertainties 
of the market.15 
These conditions may be stated in an alternative 
way. To have an efficient lease which maximizes 
the plan for the farm as a whole as well as the 
plans of both the landlord and the tenant, four in-
centive conditions have been proposed.16 These con-
ditions within the lease are: (1) the share of the 
factor of variable input must be the same as the 
share of output obtained from it, (2) the share of 
all the products must be the same, (3) each re-
source owner must receive the full share of the 
product earned by each unit of resource he con-
tributes and (4) each resource owner must have 
an opportunity to receive a return on investment 
made in one production period but not forthcoming 
until a subsequent period. These conditions can 
be considered as necessary but not sufficient. 
The sufficient condition for the perfect lease is 
the availability of capital. 
The. applicatio~ of. these criteria is hypotheti-
c~l~y: Illustrated In ~Ig. 1. The production pos-
~IbIhty curve on WhICh the rented firm operates 
IS represented by PP; the reduction in revenue 
with respect to the analogous curve P' P' is 
assumed to be induced by imperfections inherent 
in the lease arrangement. An adjustment in the 
"The third condition Is only valid for allocating resource. within the 
finn In the short-run period oC production. Also it should be pointed 
out that these conditions are not all fulfilled on' many owner-operated 
fanns. 
















~'ig. 1. Hypothetical Illustration of the relationship between efficiency 
and Jease arrangement. 
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leasing arrangement, guaranteeing fulfillment of 
the previously mentioned conditions, would make 
possible the shift to curve P' P'. The curve is 
assumed to be characteristic of a firm owning 
the same collection of factors of production but 
having no schism in the decision-making and in 
the sharing of costs and returns. 
Because of rigidity injected by customs and 
traditions, the possibility of continuous substi-
tution between the income of landlord and tenant, 
as suggested by curves such as PP or P' P', is re-
placed in practice by a few discrete positions cor-
responding to shares determined by current rental 
contracts. 
NATURE OF INEFFICIENCIES INDUCED BY LEASES 
Deviations from the efficiency conditions en-
gendered by current leasing arrangements may 
be divided into those stemming from the deter-
mination of the initial amounts of resources 
contributed and from short-term decisions. 
Problems connected with the determination of 
the initial amount of resources used are not 
treated in this study. Here, only problematic 
areas connected with allocation of resources after 
establishment of the rental contract-that is, only 
short-term decisions-are investigated. 
SHORT-TERM DECISIONS IN LEASES 
Conflicts and imperfections stemming from 
short-term decisions may be divided, for clarity 
of presentation, into intmtemporal conflicts and 
inteTtempoTal conflicts. 
INTRATEMPORAL CONFLICTS 
Intratemporal conflicts may be discussed as 
(1) sharing costs and returns, (2) sharing enter-
prises and (3) intrafirm cost transfers. 
Sha1'ing costs and 1'etu1'ns: Returns received 
by each party may not be associated with the 
costs contributed. The general effect of dis-
tortions in cost-bearing and benefit-receiving is a 
deviation from the quantity of input which would 
be profitably used by the firm in the absence of 
dissociation. The deviation usually takes the 
form of input restriction by the party who is 
expected to contribute more than he receives. 
If through bargaining, custom or simply lack of 
awareness of the dissociation, the party in question 
is induced to use the optimum quantity of input, 
the potential inefficiency is eliminated, but a 
transfer of income takes place. 
With farms operated under cash contracts, the 
only relevant issue would be the equalization of 
the rental rate with the marginal productivity of 
the landlord resources. 
Given the current pattern of resource con-
tributions by landlord and tenant in share leases, 
imperfections stemming from sharing of costs 
and benefits are particularly significaI).t for one 
type of resource-operating capital. Relation-
ships between landlord and tenant contributions 
of operating capital to each enterprise and the 
restriction in the total amount of capital imposed 
by each party are particularly relevant for under-
standing the nature and implications of current 
cost- and benefit-sharing. It is hypothesized that, 
given the limitation in the amount of operating 
capital traditionally contributed by the landlord, 
a sharing of costs equal to the sharing of benefits 
would severely limit the level of production. 
Particular attention is then devoted in empirical 
studies to the analysis of the role of operating 
capital and the impact of its restriction on farm 
organization under alternative leasing arrange-
ments. 
Sharing enterprises: The complexity of the 
effect of tenancy on resource use within the firm 
is increased when shares of enterprises are con-
sidered. When two or more enterprises are 
shared differently, both ps.rties are induced to 
allocate resources in favor of the enterprise from 
which the largest return is received. If market 
prices represent the index of consumer satis-
faction and the choice criterion for allocation of 
resources' among alternative enterprises, differ-
ential sharing would bring about a value of pro-
duction less than the maximum attainable with 
the resources used. 
Differential sharing of products is sometimes 
interpreted as an accounting device to adjust for 
differences in the contributions (of landlords and 
tenants) to total costs. If differences in cost-
sharing were exactly balanced off by differences 
in product-sharing, leasing would not need to 
result in deviation from equilibrium of produc-
tion. It is unlikely, however, that highly uniform 
sharing practices would suit situations differing 
in resource quality and quantity. 
Intmfi1'm cost transfers: A common form of 
rent in the Midwest combines share and cash 
characteristics. This arrangement calls for shares 
of grain crops, while cash is paid for hay and 
pastureY 
As shown by Chryst and Timmons, shares of 
grain crops are highly rigid because of custom 
and tradition and do not respond, within a broad 
range, to changes in price-cost relationships and 
methods of production.18 The landlord is likely 
to seek adjustment in the level of rent through 
modification of the cash rent paid on hay and 
pasture. In fact, while shares of grain crops are 
basically the same over wide areas and for 
divergent resource situations, cash rent on hay 
and pasture varies from $6 to $25 or more per 
acre. 
This arrangement, which is actually an ac-
counting device, may induce deviation from opti-
mum resource allocation, since the tenant, in 
considering marginal costs and returns of each 
individual enterprise, is induced to consider the 
cost structure resulting from this intrafirm cost 
lr In some cases ca.h rent is paid as a distinct rent on buildings. 
18 See Chryst and Timmons. op. cit. 
transfer, rather than the cost structure for the 
firm as a whole. Again, the resulting allocation 
of resources will differ from that which would 
hold under an unrestricted system of prices. 
HYPOTHESES DIRECTING STUDY 
The hypotheses guiding the empirical phase of 
this study are formulated on the basis of the 
preceding analysis within the frame of objectives 
specified. Tests of these hypotheses are intended 
to provide further insight into the structure of 
a farm where multiple interests are present and 
where the interests are regulated by custom and 
tradition. 
This inquiry proceeds according to the follow-
ing steps: (1) to delineate and measure the in-
efficiencies created by intratemporal misallo-
cations of resources within the lease, (2) to iden-
tify factors relevant in creating the gap and to 
investigate their behavior and (3) to advance 
remedial propositions. 
The specific hypotheses directing the study are: 
1. Provisions for sharing costs and returns in 
customary share leases are the cause of intra-
temporal misallocation of resources. Inefficiency 
is revealed through (a) a level of profit lower 
than the one attainable under unified entrepre-
neurship and (b) divergency between landlord's 
and tenant's optimum farm plans. The relation-
ship between restriction in the amount of land-
lord's and tenant's capital and the sharing of 
costs and returns plays an important role in deter-
mining the divergency between the two optimum 
farm plans. 
2. In a lease characterized by customary sharing 
of benefits and costs, agreement between parties 
on resource allocation and increase in efficiency 
may be obtained through appropriate modifi-
cations in the quantity of capital to be contributed 
by the landlord and the tenant. 
3. The application to a typical lease of the 
optimum conditions of sharing benefits and costs 
should be accompanied by a sizable adjustment 
in the quantity of resources contributed by the 
two parties. 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL FOR ANALYZING 
LEASING PROBLEMS 
ApPLICATION OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
TO FARM PLANNING 
Linear programming is an important analytical 
tool available to research workers concerned with 
efficient use of resources at the firm leve}.lD From 
an analytical standpoint, programming is an ampli-
fication of budgeting, since it allows simultaneous 
.. For a mare elaborate description of the nature of linear programming 
see: Charnes. A .• Cooper. W. W. and Henderson. A. An introduction 
to linear programming. John Wiley and Sons. New York; Dorfman. 
R. Application of linear programming to the theory of the firm. The 
University of California Press; Greenwald. D. U. Linear programming. 
The Ronald Press Co .• New York; and Heady. E. O. and Candler. 
Wilfred. Linear programming methods. Iowa State University Press. 
1958. 
consideration of the many alternatives available. 
It allows selection of the plan which maximizes 
profit, given the resource restrictions of the indi-
vidual situation. The basic advantage of linear 
programming, as compared with the production-
function approach, lies in a more accurate de-
scription of the technology of the firm. Three 
concepts form the basis of linear pl'ogramming: 
resources, products and production processes. 
While the first two are familiar, the third is 
somewhat new. A process is a particular method 
of producing a given product; it specifies the kind 
of input, the kind of output and the ratio of each 
input to the output. 
The main object of linear programming is 
selection of the most profitable processes for the 
products to be produced. The procedure leading 
to the determination of the optimum program 
rests on a set of assumptions which surround the 
conditions to which this analytical technique is 
applicable. The assumptions are: (1) each proc-
ess is characterized by constant proportions be-
tween inputs and outputs, regardless of the extent 
to which the process is used; (2) in divisibilities 
of resources and products are ignored; (3) the 
output of two activities produced simultaneously 
is always the sum of the output of the separate 
activities; (4) the number of processes available 
is finite; and (5) at least one resource is limiting. 
Within the framework of these assumptions, 
linear programming appears particularly adapted 
to the analysis of resource use in the farm unit. 
The simplex method has been used extensively 
to select the profit-maximizing combination of 
activities.20 In this study, the simplex method 
has been modified for determining the optimum 
combination of activities when resources are al-
located under the additional restrictions imposed 
by rental contracts. 
MODIFICATION OF SIMPLEX SOLUTION TO 
A RENTED FARM 
The basic modification consists of setting up 
the initial tableau so that it will reflect the terms 
of the lease under analysis.21 The input-output 
coefficients and the net prices are divided on the 
basis of the stipulated sharing of costs and re-
turns. Each resource available to the firm also 
is divided on the basis of the contributions by 
landlord and tenant. The net price row is divided 
into two rows, the first composed of the share 
of the net price of each activity going to the 
tenant, and the second composed of the landlord's 
shares.22 The matrix so composed is solved ac-
cording to the simplex method. 
The tenant's net price is chosen as the vector 
to be maximized first, and the enterprise with the 
largest negative net price becomes the incoming 
'" An explantation of the simple" method is given in Heady and 
Candler. ibid. 
OJ For an ex"lanation of the initial tableau See Heady and Candler. ibid. 
.. The net price is obtained by subtracting the cash expense from the 
gross revenue. Ibid •• Pp. 112·116. 
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activity in the following iteration. The solution 
proceeds until all the tenant's net prices become 
positive or zero, indicating that the selection of 
enterprises and their intensity which guarantees 
maximization of tenant's net returns has been 
attained. If at this point all the landlord net 
prices are also positive or zero, the farm plan 
which maximizes the tenant's net returns also 
maximizes the net returns for the landlord. If, 
on the other hand, some of the landlord's net 
prices are still negative, a reorganization of the 
enterprises or a modification of their level of 
intensity would increase landlord's net returns. 
The movement from the tenant's to the landlord's 
optimum combination of enterprises may proceed 
along different paths, depending upon the selec-
tion of the profitable enterprises to be introduced 
in the following iterations. We are particularly 
interested in those intermediary positions between 
the two optima which form the upper boundary 
of the feasible combinations of enterprises in the 
landlord-tenant income plane, however. 
An initial approximation of the boundary may 
be obtained by introducing in every step toward 
the landlord's optimum that enterprise which 
involves the largest increase in landlord's income 
for each unit of tenant's income given up. The 
collection of points so obtained, however, does 
not necessarily encompass all of the feasible 
points between the two optima. The correctness 
of the boundary may be checked through the 
introduction of alternative profitable enterprises 
in moving from the tenant's optimum position and 
in the following intermediary points. This trial 
and error procedure explores the possible paths 
between the two optima and thus tests the cor-
rectness of the boundary traced previously.23 
A graphical illustration of the results of a 
hypothetical solution is given in fig. 2. At point 
A, all the tenant's net prices have become positive, 
and the total net income attached to the plan 
($7,500) is shared between landlord and tenant 
in the proportion of $5,500 and $2,000, respective-
ly. Points B, C and D represent incomes flowing 
from the plans specified by each intermediate 
position between A and E on the boundary AE. 
W!J.en point E has been attained, the combination 
of enterprises which yields the largest possible re-
turn going to the landlord has been selected. 
Th.~ wider the divergency between A and E, the 
more lilrely is the lease to become a source of 
conflict between landlord and tenant. It should 
be pointed out, however, that even if the solution 
of the matrix leads to a unique point, C for ex-
ample, this is not a necessary guarantee of ef-
ficiency. Point F, for instance, could represent 
the level of total income attainable if the same 
collection of resources were employed under a 
different decision-making structure, such as 
unified ownership and control or a perfect lease. 
The methodological modification suggested here 
presents two main advantages to arriving at land-
2a In the empirical cases to which this procedure has been applied only 
a few enterprises could be introduced profitably for the landlord when 
tenant's optimum WaS attained. This considerably simplified the trlal 


















I.ANPL-ORo'S INCOME (OOLI.ARS) 
Fig. 2. Hypothetical illustration of conflicts between landlord and 
tenant in selecting the farm plan and the division of income. 
lord's and tenant's optimum through the solution 
of two simplex tableaus.24 First, the optima of 
the two parties are determined with one tableau; 
second, feasible intermediary points composing 
the upper boundary in the landlord-tenant income 
plane are also determined. 
The simplex solution of linear programming 
with variable capital restrictions may also be 
applied to obtain some knowledge about the 
modification in the degree of inefficiency and 
conflict when the quantity of capital contributed 
by the two parties is varied.25 To determine the 
tenant's capital optima, the criterion for the 
selection of incoming activities is given by the 
ratio between tenant's net price and tenant's 
capital coefficient (dj = Zj - CjT , 
ajT 
where Zj - CjT < 0, and ajT, the coefficient in 
the tenant capital row, is positive). Analogously, 
the ratio between landlord's net price and land-
lord's capital coefficient becomes the criterion 
when landlord's capital optima are sought. 
An empirical example of the proposed modifica-
tion to the simplex solution is given in Appendix 
A. 
ISOLATION AND MEASUREMENT OF LEASE-
ENGENDERED INEFFICIENCIES INHERENT IN 
A "TYPICAL LEASE" 
The measurement of inefficiency is performed 
through an ex post analysis of resource allocation 
.. Heady, E. 0., Dean, G. W. and Egbert, A. C. Analysis of alternatIve 
farm.leasing arrangements. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 445. 1956. 
,. See: Candler, Wilfred. A modified simplex solution for linear 
programming with vat-iable capital restrictiollB. Jour, Farm Ecoll. 
88:~40.955. 19~G, . . -
in a typical farm situation in north-central Iowa.26 
Isolation of inefficiency caused by intratemporal 
resource misallocation stemming from conflicts 
between landlords and tenants within the typical 
crop-share-cash lease is obtained by programming 
the available quantities of resources for two dif-
ferent types of tenure arrangements. First, linear 
programming is applied to a unified ownership 
and control (owner-operator) situation; this situ-
ation is characterized by having complete associ-
ation between bearing of costs and receipt of 
returns and perfect unity in the decision-making.21 
The farm plan and the return associated with 
this situation become the norm from which devi-
ations engendered by intmtemporal misallocation 
of resources in leasing are measured. Second, a 
situation characterized by differences between 
contribution of resources and receipt of returns 
customary in the typical crop-share-cash lease is 
similarly programmed. The eventual difference 
in net income and farm plan between the first and 
second situation is due to the arrangements for 
intratemporal allocation of resources in the lease, 
since all the other variables have remained un-
changed. 
The ex post analysis based on this procedure is 
performed for a period of 5 years, 1951 through 
1955. A graphical illustration of the analytical 
procedure is given in fig. 3. The points connected 
by the line "A" represent levels of returns at-
tained by programming the resources in the case 
,. Details on the selection of the farm. input-output coefficients. enter-
prises and leases are given in the section following. 
"Owner-operatorship as a class of tenure is not necessarily assumed 
here a. a tenure norm. It is the relationship between benefit. and 
costs and the decision-making structure connected with owner-operator-
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1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
YEARS 
Fig. 3. Hypothetical illustration of Income r«;duetion engendered by 
imperfections in a lease in intratemporal allocatIon or resources. 
of an owner-operated firm. Line B represents 
the optimum positions attainable when resources 
are allocated according to the conditions estab-
lished by the typical lease_ As illustrated pre-
viously (fig. 2), however, a wide divergency may 
exist between the landlord's and the tenant's opti-
mum plans, thus creating alternative net incomes 
attainable each year from the lease. 
This analytical procedure enables the isolation 
in individual farms of the reduction in efficiency 
caused by intratemporal allocation of resources 
in rental contracts. The difference in net income 
between line "A" and line "B" is attributable to 
the impact of the lease on intratemporal allo-
cation of resources. Coincidence of the points 
of lines "A" and "B" would indicate that a perfect 
leasing arrangement, as far as intratemporal ef-
ficiency is concerned, has been adopted. 
Within this analytical scheme, a set of efficiency 
conditions may be set up. A necessary condition 
is that the optimum plans for landlord and tenant 
must be the same. Besides this necessary con-
dition, a sufficient condition also has to be ful-
filled; namely, the optimum plan for each leasing 
party must be the same as the one for the owner-
operator. With reference to fig_ 3, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions are both attained when 
a common net income and farm plan are estab-
lished, regardless of the form of tenure and the 
decision-making structure.28 
The ex post analysis composing the first stage 
of the empirical investigation is exclusively con-
cerned with inefficiencies stemming from intra-
temporal conflicts within the lease. Abstraction 
from intertemporal analysis of resource allo-
cation permits more accurate delineation of in-
efficiencies connected with the conditions regu-
ulating the intratemporal use of resources. Fur-
thermore, it becomes possible to identify the 
relevant factors in determining the area of inef-
ficiency and thereby to develop remedial measures. 
Therefore, the programming of resource use over 
the period under examination has been performed 
separately and independently for each year. 
INEFFICIENCY TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE LEASING 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH VARIATIONS IN 
OPERATING CAPITAL 
According to the contributions of resources 
within customary leasing arrangements, operating 
capital can be varied relatively more easily than 
other factors of production. Therefore, the 
modified simplex solution for linear programming 
with variable capital restrictions is applied to a 
set of alternative te:..ure arrangements. The 
situations considered are owner-operatorship, two 
types of crop-share leases and a livestock-share 
lease. This segment of the analysis has the 
purpose of determining: (1) the relationship 
:0 This analysis is carried oul in terms of "absolute" efficiency in the 
sense that one optimum position is selected as the normative goal. 
It must be pointed out. however. that problems of "relative" efficiency 
or suboptlma. in the sense of selection of the position with minimum 
deviation from the norm. are relevant. Within any given lease If the 
norm is unattainable. the identification and adoption of the suboptimum 
position becomes the relevant goal. 
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between the capital optima when landlord's and 
tenant's net incomes are alternatively maximized 
for a given lease and (2) the relative efficiency 
of leases compared with a normative arrange-
ment when capital is allowed to vary. 
FARM SITUATION AND LEASES 
USED FOR STUDY 
THE FARM AND ITS SETTING 
The farm selected for analysis is located in the 
Clarion-Webster soil association in north-central 
Iowa in Hamilton County. It was selected from 
those farms belonging to the Farm Business 
Association for which a detailed account of pro-
duction history during the past years is availabJ~. 
The criterion for the selection of the farm was 
the fact that it is typical with respect to both 
quantity and quality of resources and type of 
rental contract.29 The analysis is carried out for 
the years 1951 through 1955. Table 1 sum-
marizes the quantities of restricting resources 
present in the selected farm during the period 
considered. 
Land. The farm size is 200 acres, of which 190 
are tillable. N oncultivated acres consist of farm-
stead, road, lots and space occupied by fences. 
Buildings. The service buildings on the farm 
include livestock housing and grain storage facili-
ties. Grain and hay storage facilities are adequate 
,. The quantity of resources present in the typical farm was determined 
from the farm data avadable at the Iowa Cooperative Crop and Live-
stock Reporting Service, Des Moines, Iowa. The characteristics of the 
typical lease are described in a study by Timmons, Improving farm 
rental arrangements in Iowa. Ope cit. 
TABLE 1. QUANTITIES OF SELECTED RESOURCES AVAILABLE 
IN THE TYPICAL FARM. HAMILTON COUNTY, 1951-55. 
Hem Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Land 
Farm size ... u •• n •••• ~ •••• _.acres 201) 200 200 200 200 
Tillable acres .............. acre. 190 190 190 190 190 
Harvested crop ..... ___ ..... acres 168 166 160 185 168 
Rotated pasture .......... Bcres 22 24 30 5 22 
Operating capital 
Total ....................... oollars 7,574 7.630 7.103 10.947 10.847 
Landlorc1 .................. dollars 467 462 625 534 501 
Tenant .................... dolla~s 7.107 7.168 6.478 10.413 10,346 
Livestock buildings 
Hog farrowing 
space .................... sq. ft. 1.680 1.&80 1.680 1,680 1,680 
Labor 
Monthly group A man·hour. 825 ~25 825 825 825 
Dec . ...................... man .. hours 275 275 275 275 275 
Jan. _____ ............. man-hours 275 275 275 275 275 
Feb. .................. man-hours 275 275 275 275 275 
Monthly group B man·hours 685 685 685 685 685 
March ................ man-hours 335 335 335 335 335 
April ................. man-hours 350 350 350 350 350 
Monthly group C man-hours 700 700 700 700 700 
May ..... __ . __ •. ____ .... mall-hours 350 350 350 350 350 
June .................. man-hours 350 350 350 350 350 
Monthly group D man-hour& 700 700 700 700 700 
July ...... _ ............ man·hour. 350 350 350 350 350 
Aug. ... ____ ................ mar ... hours 350 350 350 350 350 
Monthly group E man-hours 875 875 875 875 875 
Sept . .................... man ... hours 300 300 300 300 300 
Oct. .................... man-hours 300 300 300 300 300 
Nov. .................. man-hours 275 275 275 275 275 
Machinery available .. -............ adequate 





to handle the production from the cropland. The 
cattle barn consists of 1,176 square feet of build-
ing space and has the floor adapted to swine 
production. In addition to this possible area for 
hogs, there are 504 square feet of hog house 
available. Therefore, the total building space 
available for hogs is 1,680 square feet. 
Lab01' and management. The labor supply is 
composed of operator labor of 260 man-hours 
per month from November through February and 
275 man-hours per month from March through 
October, plus family labor equivalent to 15 man-
hours per month from November through Febru-
ary, 60 man-hours in March, 75 man-hours per 
month from April through August and 25 man-
hours per month in September and October. 
Labor supplies are grouped, as indicated in table 
1, in units of 2 or 3 months each, depending on 
labor requirements and the time available to 
complete farming operations. Hence, the labor 
restrictions are for a certain part of the season, 
rather than for the individual months. This 
method of aggregating labor supplies supposes 
that the labor requirements within different time 
groups are relatively flexible. 80 
A constant level of management is assumed 
under the different tenure arrangements. In 
other words, to isolate the impact on resource 
use exclusively attributable to changes in the 
organization of the firm, it is assumed that the 
level of management does not vary when alter-
native tenure arrangements are compared. 
Capital supply. The capital used by the firm in 
the production process is divided into two cate-
gories-fixed capital and operating capital. Fixed 
capital is composed of the investment in machin-
ery and buildings, which is present regardless 
of the level of output. It is assumed to be avail-
able in the form and quantity adequate to carry 
out production activities within the range estab-
lished by the restrictive resources. Therefore, 
depreciation and insurance on fixed capital are 
hail died as fixed costs, which have to be subtracted 
from the return associated with the optimum plan. 
Operating capital refers to the capital which 
is not tied up at the beginning of the production 
process but may be freely allocated among the 
potential enterprises. The capital requirements 
for the various enterprises include annual cash 
expenses for crops and livestock plus investment 
capital needed for equipment and breeding stock 
for the livestock enterprises . 
The levels of operating capital used in the 
ex post analysis for 1951 through 1955 are given 
in table 1. The total operating capital available 
to the firm in each production year is composed 
of the tenant's plus the landlord's operating 
capital. Total operating capital is considered in 
programming the use of resources for a situation 
reflecting owner-operatorship, while landlord's and 
tenant's operating capital are considered as two 
separate limitations when resources are allocated 
under a lease contract. 
.0 E,,,tension personnel conskter this procedure to be a realistic method 
for handlin~ lal;>or r\'.trlc~ion. j!l th\,ir effect on farm plana. 
In the second phase of the empirical analysis, 
operating capital is considered to be a continuous 
variable, adopting the modification to the linear 
programming technique developed recently.31 
ENTERPRISES USED IN PROGRAMMING 
A previous study has determined the optimum 
combinations and sizes of crop and livestock 
enterprises for a typical farm in the soil area 
considered.32 Hence, since the purpose of the 
present study is to evaluate the effect of leasing 
arrangements on optimum farm planning, only 
the range of crop and livestock enterprises in-
dicated in the previous study to be profitable and 
present in the farm during the period considered 
are included. 
CROP ENTERPRISES 
The previous study indicates that only three 
crop rotations ordi:.larily enter into the most 
profitable farm plans in this soil area.33 Thus, 
the rotations included as possibilities for this 
study are corn-corn-soybeans (CCSb), corn-soy-
beans-corn-oats-meadow (CSbCOM) and corn-
corn-oats-meadow (CCOM). The meadow in the 
last two rotations is an alfalfa-red clover-timothy 
mixture. Four fertilization levels are considered 
for each rotation (table 2). Eereafter, fertili-
zation levels for a given rotation are noted by a 
subscript following the abbreviated form of the 
rotation (for example, CCSb1• CCOM3 , CSbCOM4 ). 
Hence, there are 12 crop alternatives. Crop yields 
for the three rotations at each fertilization level 
are shown in table 3. 
The various levels of fertilization are included 
to determine eventual conflicts in selecting ro-
tations and fertilization levels between (1) alter-
native tenure arrangements given certain capital 
restrictions and (2) landlord and tenant within 
a given lease and for variable quantities of oper-
ating capital. 
The customary assumption of single-valued 
expectation with respect to the input-output 
relationship within each process or enterprise is 
also adopted in this study. Besides, the expec-
tation is assumed to rema:n unchanged in all the 
situations considered,' regardless of the tenure 
arrangement. 
Since the emphasis of this study is on leasing 
imperfections leading to inefficiencies in intra-
temporal allocation of resources, the input-output 
relationship in a given rotation is assumed to be 
unaffected by intertemporal relationships within 
the lease. 
Finally, out of the various possible ways of 
producing a given rotation, especially in what 
concerns substitutability between machinery and 
labor, only one appropriate set of techniques is 
OJ See: Candler. op. ~it. 
,. See: Mackie. A. B .• Heady. E. O. and Howell. H. B. Optimum farm 
plans for beginning tenant farmers on the Clarion.Webster soils (An 
application of linear programming). Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 449. 
1957. 
" Ibid. 
TABLE 2. POUNDS PER ACRE OF AVAILABLE NUTRIENTS 
SUPPLIED BY COMMERCIAL FERTILIZER FOR DIFFERENT RO· 
TATIONS AND FERTILIZATION LEVEES FOR CLARION.WED· 
STER SOILS.-
First Second Third Fourth 
N P K N P K N P K N P K 
Corn ........ 0 0 0 15 20 10 45 50 20 75 60 20 
Corn ........ 0 0 0 30 80 10 50 25 20 70 30 20 
Soybeans •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
Corn .......... 0 0 0 5 20 10 10 50 20 40 60 20 
Soybeans .. 0 0 0 0 U 0 U 0 U, 0 10 0 
Corn . ....... 0 0 0 15 20 10 45 50 20 75 60 20 
Oats .......... 0 0 0 10 20 (I 15 20 0 20 10 40 
Meadow .... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn .......... 0 0 0 5 10 10 10 50 20 40 60 20 
Corn .......... 0 0 0 30 20 10 60 25 20 80 30 20 
Oats .......... 0 0 0 10 20 0 15 20 0 20 35 30 
Meadow .... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• The fertilization l'ates in this table were furnished by the Department 
of Agronomy. Iowa State Univer.ity. Ames. Iowa. 
TABLE 3. ESTiMATEU CROP YIELDS PER ACRE FOR VARIOUS 
LEVELS OF FERTILIZATION FOR CLARION·WEBSTER SOILS.-
Fertilizer level 
Rotations Unit 1 ~ a 4 
COI'n .......................................... bu.hels 40 50 57 59 
Vorn .......................................... bushels 32 42 49 51 
Soybeans .................................. bushels 19 21 23 24 
Corn .......................................... bu.h.ls 58 65 67 68 
Soybeans ......... __ .. .................... bushels 20 22 24 25 
Corn .......................................... bushel. 50 56 59 61 
Oats ......................................... bu.hels 32 38 41 43 
Me:tdow ................................ __ .. tOlis 1.11 2.2 2.4 2.5 
r.;orn .......................................... bu.hel. 51! 68 67 68 
Corn ......................................... bushels 48 54 57 /ill 
Oats ...................................... bushels 32 38 41 4:1 
Meadow ................................... tons 1.9 :!I~ 2.4 2.5 
" The estimated yields were furnished by the Department of Agronomy. 
Iowa State University. Ames. They nre based on the fertilization levels 
given in table 2 and on the following assumptions: (1) Rotation. and 
treatments have been in effeet since at least 1925·30. (2) Yields 
are a 10,Year average yield estimate for the period 1951·60. assuming 
normal weather conditions. (3) Soil tests typically low in phosphorus. 
medium in potassium and medIum in nitrogen. 
chosen. Descriptions of cost items of each 1'0-
tation and its labor requirements are given in 
Appendix B. 
LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
Two livestock enterprises are considered in 
planning-the most profitable hog system and 
4~ 
cattle feeding program for average conditions.34 
Dairy and poultry enterprises are not included 
since they were found to enter the optimum 
program infrequently and with only minor changes 
in income. 
Spring pigs: This hog system includes pigs far-
rowed in March, fed out on pasture and marketed 
in November at 270 pounds. Litters average 7.8 
pigs weaned per sow, but one gilt per litter is 
saved for farrowing the following year. Pork 
sold per litter, including a 400-pound sow, aver-
ages 2,136 pounds. The death loss is estimated 
at 5 percent after weaning. 
Pasture-fed stee't' calves: The calves are pur-
chased in October and sold the following Septem-
ber. They are wintered in drylot on roughage 
and a limited amount of grain. Feed is increased 
after the calves are put on pasture, from May to 
July, and full feeding is continued in drylot until 
the calves are finished. Initial weight is 430 
pounds, and market weight is 1,000 pounds. In-
put-output data for these two livestock enterprises 
are given in Appendix C. 
PRICES USED IN PROGRAMMING 
An expectation model based on the average 
prices of the previous years has been assumed to 
have been adopted by the entrepreneur for each 
year of the period considered. Expectations about 
crop prices have been obtained by consideling the 
average of the prices occurring in the previous 10 
years, while a 5-year average is assumed for live-
stock enterprises. 
RETURNS ASSOCIATED WITH OPTIMUM 
FARM PLANS 
Net returns are maximized in the optimum 
farm plans obtained through linear programming. 
The net return coming from each activity, or "net 
price," is obtained by subtracting from the gross 
revenue the variable cost needed to produce one 
unit of the activity. The total net return, that 
is the sum of net revenues associated with the 
enterprises composing the plan is, therefore, gross 
of fixed costs. Since fixed costs do not vary in 
the situations considered, the returns given for 
farm plans are comparable and may be used to 
show the difference in income between plans. 
Net taxable return for each farm plan is obtain-
able by subtracting fixed cost from net return. 
Tenant's profit could thus be computed by sub-
tracting his fixed costs (mainly depreciation and 
insurance on machinery) from his net return. 
Similarly landlord's profit is equal to his return 
minus his quota of fixed costs (depreciation and 
insurance on buildings and property taxes). 
TYPES OF LEASES 
Even though the central part of the empirical 
analysis concerns the typical crop-share-cash lease 
and its impact on efficiency, alternative leasing 
arrangements also are analyzed. 
The leases considered in this study are outlined 
in table 4. . The -first lease is the typical arrange-
.. Ibid. 
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TABLE 4. SHARING OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES IN 
LEASING ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED IN THE STUDY. 
Receipts and exvenses 
Items Tenant's Landlord'. 
percentage vercentage 
Lease 1. Typical crop-share lease 
Corn .... __ . _____________ . _______________ .. ___ .__ 50 
Soybeans _. ____ . ___________ .... ________ . _____ ._ 60 
Oats _________ . __ ... __ ... _ .... _______ ... ___________ 60 
Fertilizer and seed expensea __ .. ____ 50 
Operating expenses _. _______ . _____ ..... __ 100 
Real estate expenses_. ____ . ___ ._ .. ______ 0 Labor .... _. _________________________________ .____ 100 
Cattle and hogs (reeeipts and 
expenses) _. ___ . ___ . ___________ .. _._ .. ______ 100 










Lease 2 Same as Lease 1 except $10 per acre cash rent for hay land 
Lease 3, Same as Lease 1 except $16 ver acre cash rent for hay land 
Lease 4. Same as Lease 1 except $29 per acre cash rent for hay land 
Lpase 5. Modified crop· share lease 
All grain crops ____ .... ________ . ______ .____ 50 50 
Value of hay and pastureb __ ._...... 50 50 
Fertilizer and seed expense __ ... _____ 50 50 
Operating expense . ______ .. _______ .. ____ 50 50 
Real estate expense ..... __ .. _ .. __ . ___ ._ 0 100 
Labor _. _____ ...... __ ........ __________ ._. __ ._____ 100 0 
Cattle and hogs (receipts and 
expense) _________ . ______ ..... __ .... _ .... ____ 100 0 
Lease 6. Livestock-share lease 
Livestock receipts ___ ...... __ ._ ...... _.... 50 
Investment in liVestock and livestock equipment _____________ ... ____ 50 
Livestock expenses ....... ___ ..... _._____ 50 
Crop receiPts _ ... _. ________ . ____________ .. _ 50 
Fertilizer and seed _________________ ..... 50 
Operating expenses _ ...... __ .... __ .______ 50 
Real estate expenses_. ______ . ___ ._______ 0 









• Landlord furnishes all the grass and legume seed, while tenant fur-
nishes all of the seed oats. 
b It is assumed that the tenant purchases the landlord's share of the 
hay and pasture at the market price for hay. 
ment in north-central Iowa, as pointed out in a 
study by Timmons.a5 The feature which varies 
most frequently in this lease is the' amount of 
cash rent paid for hay land. In practice, the cash 
rent varies from a minimum of $6 to a maximum 
of about $25 per acre. To study the effect on 
efficiency of the change in magnitude of this type 
of intrafirm cost transfer, leases 2, 3 and 4 are 
considered. They are identical to lease 1, except 
that the cash rent is varied from $10 to $16 and 
to $29 per acre. In the last lease, the cash rent 
of $29 per acre is equivalent to the marginal re-
turn to land as derived from the optimum farm 
plan for the owner-operator. In a fifth lease 
alternative, the incentive conditions which en-
courage achievement of efficient intratemporal 
allocation of resources have been introduced in 
the crop-share lease.3o Finally, a typical livestock-
share lease is analyzed. 
The analysis of these leases permits the in-
vestigation of the comparative effect on efficiency 
given a common resource situation and price 
expectations and the eventual changes in the level 
of efficiency and conflict between parties with-
in a lease when operating capital is introduced as 
a continuous variable. 
THE RESULTS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION 
FARM PROGRAM UNDER UNIFIED AND 
DIVIDED RESOURCE CONTROL 
It is necessary to define and measure the 
"" See: Timmons, Improving farm rental arrangements in Iowa, P. 416 . 
"" See: Hurlburt, up. cit .. Pp. 86-90. 
problem before formulating conclusions and pos-
sible remedies. A preliminary delimitation of the 
impact of customary leasing provisions on re-
source efficiency is attained through an ex post 
analysis comparing the fann programs attainable 
under owner-operatorship with those associated 
with a typical crop-share-cash lease. 
For each individual year-1951 through 1955-
linear programming has been applied to the bundle 
ot resources available for production to deter-
mine the optimum fann programs under two 
tenure situations-unified resource control and 
ownership and typical crop-share-cash lease. The 
first situation is characterized by a complete 
association between benefits and costs and by 
unity in the decision-making process. The second 
situation usually represents the dissociation be-
tween benefits and costs and the schism in deci-
sion-making. The linear programming technique 
applied to the second situation, with the modifi-
cation described in Appendix A, leads eventually 
to two alternative programs-landlord's and ten-
ant's. 
The programs and net income associated with 
these situations are presented in table 5. The 
levels of net income are shown in fig. 4. 
The interpretation of the results of this analysis 
leads to a series of considerations about the 
relationships between leasing provisions and re-
source efficiency: 
1. A typical crop-share lease is a source of 
inefficiency in the intratemporal allocation of 
resources at the firm level. This is indicated by 
the discrepancy in total returns between the opti-
mum program under unified ownership and those 
of the tenant and landlord. The discrepancy be-
tween levels of returns exists in every year of 
the period considered. The data in table 5 thus 
give empirical support to the hypothesis that 
inefficiency is engendered by the typical rental 
contract. It is relevant to note that the magni-
tude of the income reduction is not constant, but 
varies from year to year. The income associated 
with the lease, expressed as a percentage of the 
owner-operator income, varies from a maximum 
of 92.5 percent in 1953 to a minimum of 77 per-
cent in 1955. In the analytical model used, the 
factors which have been allowed to vary during 
the period analyzed are: (a) price expectations, 
(b) amounts of landlord's and tenant's operating 
capital and (c) capital coefficients of the activi-
ties. The variation throughout the period of in-
come reduction caused by the crop-share-cash 
lease indicates that conflicts created by imper-
TABLE 5. OPTIMUM FARM PLANS AND ASSOCIATED RETURNS UNDER OWNER-OPERATORSHIP AND A TYPICAL CROP-SHARE-
CASH LEASE, 1951-55. 
Total Landlord's Tenant's Boef 
Tenure returns 
Year situation (dollars) returns 
returns (dollars) (dollars) Rotation 
Hogs calves Limiting (acre.) (litters) (head) resources 
1951 Owner.operator'. opt,mum plan .•.....•..•.•...•• 6,965 168 CCSb. 19 0 Land 
Capital 
3,006 2,972 Landlord'. optimum plan ...............•......• _... 5,978 92 CCOM, 21 0 Land 
76 CCSb. Landlord'. capitol 
Corn 
2,868 3,003 Tenant's optimum plan ................................ 5,871 52 CCOM, 10 0 Land 
115 CSbCOM. Landlord's capital 
Corn 
1952 Owner-operator'. optimum plan ........•......... 7,611 165 CCSba 19 0 Land 
Capital 
3,304 3,003 Landlord's optimum plan •...••...•• _ ••. _ .... _.... 6,307 22 CCOM, ~1 0 Land 
78 CCSb. Landlord's capital 
Corn 
3,304 3,003 Tenant's olJtimum plan •...........................•.• 6,307 22 (COM, i'l 0 Land 
78 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Corn 
19i13 Owner-operator'. optimum plan ............•.•..•. 7,6711 160 CCSb, 17 0 Land 
Capital 
Landlord's optimum plan ............................ 7,013 3,681 3,3U2 12 CCOM, 1U 0 Land 
147 CCSh. Landlord's capital 
Tenant's capital 
Tenant's optimum plan ................................ 6,959 3,583 3,lI76 55 CSbCOM, 20 0 Land 
105 CCSb, Landlord'. capital 
Tenant's capital 
Corn 
1954 Owner-operator's optimum plan .................. 9,762 93 CSbCOMa 23 22 Land 
92 Cc.;Sba oJapltal 
Hog housing 
Hay 
Landlord's optimum plan ............................ 7,64:1 4,072 3,477 88 CCOM, 0 33 Land 
Landlord'. capital 
Hay 
'lenant's optimum plan ................................ 8.665 ~,857 4.808 85 CSbCOM. 0 52 Land 
40 CCOM. Landlord's capital 
52 CCOM, Cattle housing 
6 CCSh. Hay 
Corn 
1955 Owner-operator'. optimum plan .................. 10,452 10 CSbCOM. 24 16 Land 
159 CCSb. Capital 
Hog housing 
Hay 
Landlord's optimum plan ............................ 8,013 3,787 4,226 81 CCSb. 1 49 Land 88 CCOM, Landlord's capital 
Hay 
Com 
Tenant's optimum plan ................................ 8,009 3,7tn 4,248 liO CCOM, 0 54 Land 



















INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH OWNER-OPERATOR'S 
OPTIMUM PLANS 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH LANDLORD'S 
OPTIMUM PLANS 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH TENANT'S 
OPTIMUM PLANS 
I I 
1951 1952 1953 1954 
YEARS 
1955 
F'ig. 4. Income asso"iated with owner-operator'., landlord's and ten_ 
ant', optimum plans and actual farm plans, 1951-55. 
fections in the rental contract are not independent 
of these factors. This phase of the analysis thus 
points out the necessity of investigating the 
relationship between each of these factors and the 
presence of leasing-engendered inefficiency. 
2. The results summarized in table 5 indicate 
the presence of important conflict between the 
landlord and the tenant. The necessary conditions 
for efficiency which call for identity between 
landlord's and tenant's farm plans are fulfilled 
only in 1952. The divergency between the two 
plans, which can be measured in terms of the 
change of the income of each party in going 
from one optimum plan to the other, varies from 
year to year. This indicates that the conflict 
between the two parties of the lease is signifi-
cantly affected by changes in the amounts of 
operating capital, changes in costs of enterprises 
expressed as changes in the capital coefficients 
and changes in the prices of the products ex-
pressed as changes in the shares of the net price 
of each activity.37 The impact of these factors 
on the conflict between landlord's and tenant's 
production plans needs to be investigated if a 
greater insight into the mechanics of conflicts 
engendered by leasing is desired. 
Additional understanding of resource allocation 
as influenced by customary rental provisions is 
obtained by comparing the farm programs of the 
owne~'-operator, the landlord and the tenant as 
37 Logically. landlord-tenant conflict might be influenced by other 
factors. such as contribution of factors other than operating capital and 
divergent expectation of input-output coefficients. In the analytical 
model employed ill this study. however, these factors have been kept 
constant. 
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given in table 5. The optimum programs under 
unified ownership remain relatively unchanged 
during the period. Through 1953, with the low 
price expectation for beef cattle, hogs are the 
only livestock entering the plan, and operating 
capital receives greater return when used in 
fertilizing the CCSb rotation. In 1954 and 1955, 
with a higher expected price for beef cattle, it 
becomes convenient to include a rotation which 
increases the hay supply, such as CSbCOM. The 
increase in the amount of operating capital during 
the same years encourages a medium level of 
fertilization in both rotations entering the plan. 
Land and capital are the limiting resources 
throughout the period, and, obviously, the change 
in the production plan is a function of the com-
bination of enterprises which would maximize the 
returns to the limiting factors. Hog housing and 
hay become limitational when the expected price 
of cattle increases and there is an increment in 
the availability of operating capital. 
The comparison between landlord's and ten-
ant's optimum plans demonstrates how the intra-
temporal dissociation of costs and benefits re-
solves into conflict about the types and the 
intensities of enterprises to introduce into the 
plan. With limited capital (around $500 in each 
of the years considered) the landlord is unable, 
even under his limited share of cost, to contribute 
the amount of operating capital to achieve the 
level of fertilization which appears to be profit-
able for the owner-operator. Therefore, he finds 
it most profitable to select the rotation and the 
fertilizer level which would give him the highest 
return per dollar invested. Accordingly, the land-
lord's optimum programs include a portion of 
the tillable area devoted to a CCOM rotation with-
out fertilization and the remaining area to CCSb 
with light fertilization. Land and landlord's 
capital are the resources limiting the intensity of 
production in the landlord's optimum program. 
It is interesting to note that landlord's capital 
is restrictive to the extent of letting a portion 
of tenant's capital lay idle. This, of course, re-
sults from the rigidity of relationship between 
coefficients and amounts of available resources 
implied in the linear programming solution_ In 
practice, it is likely that the tenant would use 
his unused capital to intensify the level of pro-
duction to the point at which the proportion that 
he receives of the marginal return to capital 
would equal the cost. 
The tenant's optimum program, instead of the 
CCSb rotation selected by the landlord, includes 
a meadow rotation, CSbCOM. This is explained 
by the low cash rent ($6 per acre) charged on 
meadow and by the fact that landlord's capital 
used in producing crops adds a disproportionate 
share to the tenant's return in relation to tenant's 
contribution. Also, in the tenant's optimum 
program, landlord's capital is a severely restrict-
ing factor which makes tenant's capital remain 
idle. Proportional relationships between land-
lord's and tenant's capital seem to be an im-
pOl'tant factor in creating intratemporal conflicts 
between the two parties of the lease and between 
tenure arrangements. 
MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESTRICTIVE RESOURCES 
The price of resources is the allocative criterion 
not only in formal economic theory but also in 
linear programming. The principle of "op~or­
tunity cost" lies at the root of linear prograIIl:mmg, 
which is essentially based on an enumerabon of 
the opportunities available for the use of a given 
set of resources. Even though linear programming 
seems to arrive at an optimum allocation without 
recourse to the concept of price, a problem of 
pricing or valuation is implicit in the linear pro-
gramming solution. .. . 
This problem of ascrIbmg values to the serVIces 
of several resources separately is of particular 
significance for the traditional firm whenever a 
great enough: time horiz!ln of decision per~its 
adjustments m the holdmgs of durable capItal 
equipment. The question of which types of re-
sources should be acquired and which should be 
disposed of can be answered only by comparing 
the value of the contribution to net revenue of 
each resource with its acquisition cost or disposal 
price. In the firm in which multiple inte.rests 
are present and the bundle 0: resources avaIlable 
for production is obtained through the contribu-
tion of two parties, the problem of valuation of 
resources is particularly important. In fact, 
besides the determination of the quantity of each 
resource, the quota contributed by each party 
is of crucial significance. The assignment of 
value to the quantities of resources contributed 
by each party is a necessary step in the deter-
mination of maladjustments in resource con-
tributions which necessarily result in a decrease 
of efficiency. 
A linear programming solution imputes prices 
to the restrictive resources. In the simplex solu-
tion, the optimum program has been determined 
when all the elements of the "marginal revenue" 
row have become positive or zero. The entries in 
the "marginal revenue" row which are associated 
with resource disposal activities are the imputed 
prices per unit of the potential restricting re-
sources. The factors which are restrictive in the 
final plan possess a marginal return greater than 
zero, while the idle sectors of factors are free 
goods, and their price equals zero. These values, 
when multiplied by the quantities of factors em-
ployed, account for the total return resulting 
from the optimum plan. 
In the modified simplex solution used in this 
study, the net price row is divided into two rows, 
the landlord's and the tenant's.38 When the 
optimum plan is reached for either the landlOl'd 
or the tenant, the solution imputes the contribu-
tion of each resource to the net income of the 
two parties. It is thus possible to determine, in 
comparing landlord's and tenant's optimum plan 
with that of the owner-operator, the changes in 
marginal returns to restricting resources induced 
38 For an illustration oC the modified simplex solution see Appendix A. 
by leasing. In addition, comparison between land-
lord's and tenant's optimum nrograms and related 
marginal returns from factors to each party 
provides a useful insight into the structural 
distribution of returns to landlord and tenant as 
a function of the lease and of the proportion of 
resource contribution. 
Table 6 presents the marginal returns to re-
strictive resources associated with optimum pro-
grams with unified ownership during the period 
under analysis. The marginal returns to re-
strictive factors from both landlord's and tenant's 
optimum plans during the same years are pre-
sented in table 7. 
TABLE 6. MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESTRICTIVE RESOURCES 
IN THE OWNER-OPERATOR'S OPTIMUM PLANS. 1951-55. DOL-
LARS." 
Items 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Marginal return to land ... _. ________ . __ 13.36 20.S3 24.51 29.88 :lS.66 
Marginal return to capita!._. _______ ._ 0.62 0.54 0.51 0.37 0.36 
Marginal return to hog housing ____ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.77 
Marginal return to hay _______________ . __ 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.43 11.08 
• The quantities of disposal resources are given in tahle 8. They ha,'e 
not been included in the table since In the programming solution a mar-
ginal return equal to zero is imputed to them. 
A comparison between the returns to factors 
in the two tenure situations shows a more ef-
ficient utilization of the limiting resources in the 
owner-operator plan. The complete ass!l~iat!on 
between benefits and costs allows a full ublIzabon 
of the supply of operating capital. Land and 
capital are the restricting resources throughout 
the period. In 1954 and 1955, the larger amount 
of capital available (see table 1) reduces the 
marginal returns to capital with respect to the 
previous years, but. the return to lan.d, whic.h cap 
be viewed as the fIxed factor to whIch capItal IS 
applied, is correspondingly increased. 
A comparison of marginal returns to factors 
under landlord's and tenant's optimum plans il-
lustrates the distortion induced by the pattern of 
resource contribution and sharing of returns by 
the two parties in a typical crop-share-cash lease. 
Landlord's capital is highly restrictive, its mar-
ginal return being as high as $2.44 (in 19~2). 
Because of the limitation in landlord's capItal, 
which is a necessary complement in all the crop 
enterprises, tenant's caI>,ital lies idle and. has. a 
marginal return equal to zero. The conflIcts m 
resource use between landlord and tenant thus 
chiefly concern the allocation of landlord's capital 
as suggested by the change in marginal return 
to this resource when reallocated from landlord's 
to tenant's optimum program. 
The conflicts over the allocation of landlord's 
capital affect the return to land, which in every 
year is lower than the return received by land 
under owner-operatorship. The allocation of land, 
also a restricting resource during the whole period, 
lH 
TABLE 7. MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESTRIGrlvS RESOURCES IN LANDLoRO'S ANO TENANT'S OPTIMUM PLANS IN A TYPICAL 
CROP-SHAR&CASH L:EASE, 1951-55, DOLLARS.' 
Item! 1961 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Landlord'. optimum plan 
Marginal return to landlord from land ............................................................ .. 14.81 15.32 16.11 16.83 16.71 
Marginal return to tenant from land .............................................................. .. 12.21 11.28 -4.10 23.36 19.21 
Marginal return to landlord from landlord's capitaJ. ..................................... .. 1.11 164 1.76 1.79 1.95 
Marginal return to tenant from landlord's capitaL ........................................ .. 1.97 2.44 1.50 -3.93 1.47 
Marginal return to landlord from tenant's capital .......................................... .. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marginal return to tenant from tenant'. capital ............................................ .. 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 
Marginal return to landlord from hay ............................................................ .. 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marginal return to tenant from hBY ................................................................ .. 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.86 6.44 
Marginal return to landlord from COrn ............................................................. . 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marginal r"turn to tenant from corn .................................... _ ......................... . 0.77 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.89 
Tenant's optimum plan 
Marginal return to landlorl) from land ............................ _ ............................... . 15.80 15.82 -1.18 16.90 16.35 
Marginal return to tenant from land .............................................................. .. 11.99 11.28 1.56 14.76 17.85 
Marginal return to landlord from landlord's capitaL .................................... .. 0.45 1.64 .. 1.11 0.80 0.94 
Marginal return to tenant from landlord's capitaL ......................................... .. 2.11 2.44 0.43 2.03 2.31 
Marginal return to landlord from tenant's capitaL. ........................................ .. 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 
Marginal return to tenant from tenant's capitaL. ........................................... . 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 
Marginal return to landlord from corn ............................................................. . 0.00 0.00 .. 0.93 ..0.24 -0.16 
Marginal leturn to tenant from corn ............................................................... . 0.77 0.87 0.04 0.67 1.02 
Marginal return to landlord from hay .................................................. _ ........ .. 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.13 
Marginal return to tenant from hay .......................... _ ..................................... . 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.46 2.21 
• The quantities of disposal resources are given in table 8 They have not been included in the table since in the programming solution 0. marginal 
return equal to zero is imputed to them. • 
is analogously an element of conflict between 
the two parties. The degree of conflict over the 
allocation of land among potential enterprises 
might become so great that one party would be 
better off to have less land if it were to be al-
located to maximize the profit of the other. In 
1953, for example, the allocation of land to maxi-
mize landlord's profit is so suboptimum for the 
tenant that planting the last 8 acres actually 
reduces the total income of the tenant. The in-
verse occurs if the tenant's optimum program is 
established. Between the two plans there may be 
intermediate plans in which returns from land to 
both landlord and tenant are positive and in which 
the total return is greater than that associated 
with the optimum program for either party (see 
table 9). 
The quantities of resources which have re-
mained partially or totally unutilized in the 
alternative optimum programs are presented in 
table 8,39 This tabl~ i.s, in a sense, a counterpart 
of the table contammg the marginal returns. 
Frol!l an analysis C?f bo~h tables" useful sug-
gestIons can be derived III connectIon with the 
size of the categories of resources. Given the 
technique of producing the enterprises which has 
been assumed in this study-that is, given the 
assumed substitution between labor and machinery 
-the amount of labor available appears to be out 
of proportion with the other resources, particularly 
land and operating capital. In fact, in the plans 
corresponding to the two alternative tenure situ-
ations, all the labor groups in every year present 
disposal quantities. This indicates that the level 
3D Disposal resourCeS refer only to the amount of resources left un. 
utilized by the enterprises cons:dered in programming. This does not 
exclude the possibility of Increasing these resource. in activities not 
considered here. For example, labor is likely to be employed in 
activities such as fence repairing, land Improvemellh, l1laln~nance 
of buildings and machinery. - .. 
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of output at which land and capital become 
limiting is too low to allow full utilization of the 
labor supply within the firm. An interfirm re-
allocation of resources thus could lead to greater 
efficiency. Therefore, the landlord would not 
become worse off in associating with a tenant 
owning the same amount of capital and a smaller 
amount of labor.40 The present tenant, on the 
other hand, would gain by associating with a land~ 
•• The amount of labor needed for the optimum plans may be obtained 
by subtracting the disposal quantity of labor in each group (table 9) 
f,'om the quantity initially available (table I), 
TABLE 8. COMPARISON BETWEEN QUANTITIES OF DISPOSAL 
RESOURCES ASSOCIATED WITH OWNER-OPERATOR'S, LAND. 
Year 










ABC D E (tons) (bUB.) 
1951 Owner-operator.. 0 369 697 410 202 507 188 24 4,040 
Landlord ............ 897 180 690 391 217 355 286 65 0 
Tenant .............. 1,403 267 648 398 330 365 449 100 0 
1952 Owner-operator.. 0 
Landlord ............ 1,137 
Tenant ................ 1,137 
325 695 407 205 506 191 26 3.886 
197 692 394 222 362 291 67 0 
197 692 394 222 362 291 67 0 
1953 Owner.operator .. 
Landlord .......... .. 
Tenant ............... . 
o 514 709 433 230 521 229 44 3,994 
o 308 696 410 224 488 228 48 0 
o 262 671 403 273 482 300 64 P 
1954 Owner-operator.. 0 0 621 330 118 399 121 
Landlord ............ 3,152 1,680 680 465 81 269 259 




1955 Owner-operator.. 0 0 619 328 120 408 121 
Landlord ............ 563 1,567 621 421 37 199 247 




• ... ~_ ...... _A, ... _ ~_~ ..... _ .............. . 
'" 
TABLE 9. LANDLORD'S, TENANT'S AND TOTAL INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH ALTERNATIVE FARM PROGRAMS BETWEEN TENANT'S 




First Second Third Fourth 
intermediate intermediate intermediate Intermediate 
program program program program 
1951 
Landlord'. income •...•.•..........•....•......•.••..•....•..... _ .....•.. 2,869 
Tenant's income ........••••..••••••••............••....•................... 3,003 
TotaL •••.•..•••••...............•..•••••...........•...• _ ...••...•....•.....•.. 5,872 
1952 
Landlord's income .....•.....•...••..•.• _ ..............•••..••• _ .•...••• 3,305 
Tenant's income ............................................. ....... ..... 3,304 
Total .................... _ ...................... _ .... _...................... 6,609 
1953 
Landlord's income ................ _ .... _ ...................... _........ 3,583 
Tenant's income ............................................................ 3,376 
TotaL ..• _ ... __ .......................... _ .................................. 6,959 
1954 
Landlord's incorr.e ........................................................ 3,857 
Tenant's income ............................................................ 4,808 
Tr.taL. .......... _ ............................................................. 8,665 
1955 
Landlord's income ........................................ _ .............. 3,761 
Tenant's income ............................ _ ............................. 4,248 







lord provided with a larger amount of land and 
capital,41 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN OPTIMUM PROGRAMS OF 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for opti~ 
mum resource allocation within a rented farm 
have been expressed previously. It has been 
shown that in the typical crop-share lease applied 
to the selected quantities of resources and input-
output relationships, the sufficient condition 
(identity of rented farm plan with owner-operated 
farm plan) was not fulfilled during the period 
under analysis. To complete the ex post analysis 
of resource allocation in a typical rented farm, it 
is relevant to investigate the deviations from the 
necessary condition for efficiency (identity be-
tween landlord's and tenant's programs). 
The net incomes associated with landlord's, 
tenant's and intermediate farm plans are sum-
marized in table 9. Intermediate farm plans are 
those corresponding to iterations in the simplex 
solution between the two optima and which con-
stitute the upper boundary of the feasible com~ 






































































The data are graphed in fig. 5. As shown in 
the graphical presentation of the data, landlord-
tenant conflicts on intratemporal allocation of 
resources may actually fit into three general 
cases: (1) identity of plans of the two parties 
(as in 1952), (2) two alternative positions only, L LANDLORD'S INCOME (DOLLARS) ~(~3n~In-~-L--L-_ILI~I~~I~~~~~~,~L-o ' 3,000 3,5CO ",000 
.. Although the problem of interfirm resource allocation is beyond the 
scope of this study, It i. relevant to point out that the study of resource 
contribution within a lease could lead to interesting suggestions pertinent 
to interindustry aUociition of reso:Jrces • 
•• See Appendix A for the procedure used in selectinlt tile intermeqillte 
ulaus. Fig. 5. Income possibility curves for landlord and tenant in a typical crop-share.cash lease, Ulil·fi5, 
landlord's and tenant's optima (as in 1951 and 
1955) and (3) the two optima separated by a 
series of intermediate plans, which generate an 
income possibility curve (as in 1953 and 1954). 
. For 1952, the adoption of a farm plan is not a 
source of conflict between landlord and tenant 
since a common plan maximizes the return of 
both parties (see table 9 and fig. 5). This, how-
ever, does not indicate that an efficient allocation 
of resources has been achieved, since coincidence 
between total return under unified ownership 
and rented situations is not guaranteed. In effect 
there is a sizable gap between owner-operator and 
rented situations for 1952 (see table 5 and fig. 4). 
The conflict between two alternative optimum 
programs (as in 1951 and 1955) could be solved 
in most instances through compensation. This 
could be the case when the movement from one 
optimum to the other implies an increase in total 
net income large enough to compensate the party 
whose plan is being abandoned, so as not to leave 
him worse off, and at the same time to increase 
the net income of the party whose plan is being 
adopted. In both years, the increase in total net 
income which accompanies the adoption of land-
lord's optil?um program is large enough to permit 
compensation of the tenant. The conflict is less 
easily reconciled, however, when the increase in 
one party1s income is equal to the decrease in the 
other party's income. 
In 1953 and 1954, intermediate farm plans be-
tween the two optima become feasible and the 
selection of the program is therefore likely to be 
based on the bargaining strength of the two 
parties. 
The ex post analysis of resource allocation in 
the typical crop-share-cash lease leads to the 
conclusion that the area of conflict between land-
lord and tenant engendered by intratemporal im-
perfections in the lease is not of constant magni-
tude. b~t varies considerably from year to year. 
As mdICated by the data in table 9 landlord's ~nd tenant's positions are responsive 'to changes 
In such .factors as expected pric~s of products, 
cha!lges In the amount of contrIbution of operating 
cap~tal and ~t~er resources and changes in the 
capItal coeffICIents of the enterprises. These 
factors, as mentioned previously, have been 
all~wed to yary during the analysis, which ex-
plams the dIvergency between the income of indi-
vidual years as presented in fig. 5. 
This pha.se o~ the analysis has been chiefly 
methodologIcal In the sense of establishing a 
procedure to ·measure intrafirm inefficiency en-
gendered by different tenure arrangements. With 
reference to the area of intratemporal resource 
allocation in a typical crop-share-cash lease the 
suggested methodological procedure has indicated 
the presence and delimited the magnitUde of in-
efficiency over the period under analysis. In 
addition, factors which seem to affect signifi-
cantly the pattern of resource allocation within 
the lease have been indicated. An analysis of a 
more specific and diagnostic nature, however, 
which would allow only one factor to vary at the 
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time, is necessary to determine more precisely the 
individual impact of these factors on efficiency 
of resource use and distribution of income. 
ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF SUPPLEMENTARY 
CASH RENT 
Variations in the typical crop-share lease con-
sidered previously are commonly introduced by 
changing the amount of cash rent paid per acre 
on meadow and permanent pasture. If it appears 
that a higher share on grain crops may be in 
order, the cash rent for hay or pasture or build-
ings can be increased instead. But, as suggested 
in the theoretical analysis, cash rent represents 
an intrafirm "bookkeeping" which distorts the 
cost structure of some enterprises within the 
farm and becomes a cause of interenterprise cost 
transfer and, eventually, of inefficiency, 
The analysis has been performed by program-
ming under alternative levels of cash rent, the 
bundie of resources available for production in 
the typical farm in 1955 with price expectations 
and cost coefficients of that year. The different 
cash rent was the only varied element between 
the programmed situations. As indicated earlier, 
four levels of cash rents were considered: $6, $10, 
$16 and $29 per acre. The first amount corre-
sponds to the rent paid in the situation previously 
analyzed for the years 1951-55; the second and 
the third are levels of cash rent commonly paid 
in north-central Iowa, the last is equal to 
the marginal return to land associated with the 
owner-operator's optimum plan for the year under 
analysis. 
The results of the programmed solutions are 
summarized in table 10 and presented graphically 
in fig. 6. Three main effects appear to be con-
nected with the increase in the cash rent on hay: 
(1) proportional reallocation of total returns in 
favor of the landlord, (2) decrease in efficiency 
expressed as a progressive decrease in total return 
and (3) increase in conflicts between the landlord 
and the tenant on the selection of the farm plan, 
indicated by the increase of intermediate programs 
between the two optima when the cash rent is 
progressively increased. 
When the cash rent is $6 per acre, the conflict 
between the landlord and tenant is a minor one, 
concerning the levels of the rotations composing 
the plan. Given the low level of cash rent, the 
tenant prefers to allocate a larger portion of the 
tillable area to a meadow rotation than the pro-
portion which is optimum for the landlord. The 
landlord prefers a more intensive application of 
the corn-corn-soybeans rotation. The landlord's 
plan appears to be slightly more profitable than 
the tenant's plan. 
When the cash rent is raised to $10 per acre, 
the main impact, particularly between landlord's 
and tenant's optimum plan, is of a reduction in 
efficiency rather than a redistribution of income. 
The tenant's optimum program is, in total, more 
advantageous, and compensation to the landlord 
could be easily applied. 
When, the c~~h rE;mt if? raiseq to ,16 and '29 
TABLE 10. FARM PROGRAMS AND ASSOCIATED INCOME FOR A TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASE IN THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
CASH RENT ON HAY, 1955. 
Total Landlord's 
net income net income 
(doll'!rs) (doHars) 
Cash rent On hay $6 
Tenant's optimum program ............ ___________ . ___ . __ 8.009 3,761 
Landlord's optimum program ............. __ ._--.... _-. 8,013 3,787 
Cash rent on bn;,' $10 
Tenant's optimum program ·····._ ••• ___ ••••• • ••••• u •••• 7,821 3,872 
Landlord'. optimum l>rogram ..... --_ .................. 7,573 3,873 
Cash rent on hay $16 
Tenant's optimum program ___________ ... _ .... u.o. __ •••• 7.523 3,989 
First intermediate program .......... __ ........ -_ ... - 7,535 4,002 
Second i.ntermediate program 
._------------------------
7,386 4,010 
Landlord's optimum program -----------~-------. -.---- 7,375 4,010 
Cash rent on hay $29 
Tenanes optimum program __ . ___ .. _. __ .... ____ .. _. ______ 7.178 3,739 
First intermediate program .. -.... _-------.----_.-.---_ .. 7,424 4,068 
Second intermediate program 
---_._--.---.. _ .. _--------- 7,271 4,102 
Landlord's optimum p!ogram ._-_._--,----..... , ........ 7,075 4,129 
per acre, both reduction in efficiency and transfer 
of income seem to occur. Moreover, the conflicts 
between the two parties on the selection of the 
farm plan become more acute. The meadow 
rotations become less profitable for the tenant 
while becoming highly profitable for the land-
lord. The intermediate plans, combining both 
preferences, bear returns higher than the extreme 
plans. Their total income, however, is consider-
ably lower than the one characterizing the most 
convenient farm plan when the cash rent on hay 
is smaller, A reduction in total return of $589 
is suffered in moving from the most profitable 
plan associated with a cash rent of $6 to the one 
associated with $29 per acre cash rent. 
The empirical evidence obtained through this 
analysis leads to the conclusion that cash rent 
on hay, viewed as a measure of income redistri-
bution between the parties of the lease, has a 
detrimental impact on the efficiency of resource 
allocation. Interenterprise cost transfer engen-
dered by the distortion in cost structure associ-
ated with the payment of cash rent on hay con-
siderably reduces the possibility of achieving an 
efficient allocation of resources within the farm. 
It is therefore advisable to adopt other measures 
to achieve the desired income transfer between 
the partief? ~nd, thus, maintain efficiency. 
Tenant·s 
net income Rotnt:on~ Holts Calves Limiting (dollars) (acres) (litt~rs) (number) resources 
4,248 80 CCOM, (J 54 Land 
16 CCOM, Landlord's capital 
n CCSb, Hay 
Corn 
4,226 81 C(;Sb, 48 Land 
8u CCOM, Landlord'. capital 
Hay 
Corn 
3,949 84 CCOM, 49 Land 
81 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Hay 
Corn 
3,700 84 CCCM, 21 0 Land 
81 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Hay 
Corn 
3,534 80 CCOM, 2 48 Land 
81 CCSb2 Landlord's capital 
3 CCSb, Hay 
Corn 
3,533 84 CCUM, 2 48 Land 
81 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Tenant's capital 
Corn 
3.376 120 CCOM, 46 Land 
45 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Tenant's capital 
Corn 
3.365 120 CCOM, 22 0 Land 
45 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Corn 
3,439 105 CCSb, H 0 Land 
63 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Corn 
3,358 84 CCOM, ZI 0 Land 
81 CCSb, Landlord's capital 
Corn 
3,169 120 CCOM, 22 0 Land 
45 CCSb, Landlord's c.'lPital 
Corn 
2,846 56 CCOM, ~3 0 Land 
112 CCOM, Landlord's capital 
Corn 
VARIABLE OPERATING CAPITAL; 
A RESTRICTION IN ALTERNATIVE LEASES 
The total amount of operating capital and the 
portions contributed by each party also appeared 
to be relevant elements in determining the level 
of efficiency achievable in the selected farm. 
Analysis is now directed to comparing the ef-
ficiencies of alternative leases and determining 
for each lease the optimum levels of operating 
capital to be contributed by each party. 
The allocation of resources and the return 
obtained under a situation of owner-operatorship 
is also assumed here to be the norm with which 
alternative arrangements are compared. The leases 
for which efficiency is measured and compared 
are: (1) the typical crop-share-cash lease with 
$6 cash rent on hay, (2) a crop-share lease modi-
fied on the basis of the incentive conditions for 
intratemporal efficiency and (3) a typical live-
stock-share lease.43 The analysis is perfonned 
by applying to each of these situations the modifi-
cation to the linear programming technique where-
by the optimum farm organization can be deter-
mined with one resource as a continuous variable, 
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ating capital is the resource which is applied to 
the bundle of resources available for production 
in the selected farm with price expectations for 
the year 1955. 
OPTIMUM FARM PLANS UNDER OWNER-
OPERATORS HIP 
The farm plans resulting from the programming 
solution for an owner-operator situation when 
capital is allowed to vary are presented in table 
11 and graphed fig. 7. All plans representing 
"corner" points are included to indicate the capital 
level at which the farm plan changes because a 
resource other than operating capital becomes 
restricting. In the graphical presentation of 
the results, the total distance to the uppermost 
line, or the points PI (i = 1 to 9), represents the 
total returns (on the vertical axis) associated with 
the amount of capital indicated on the horizontal 
axis. The total returns are divided into the 
portions contributed by the enterprises comprising 
the plan. For example, at P 5 the total returns 
are made up of hogs and crop returns and amount 
to $9,580. Of this, $6,720 is credited to the 
rotation enterprise and the remainder contributed 
by the hog enterprises. Point P 9 represents maxi-
mum profits from fixed resources other than 
capital; the amount of capital ($15,205) used at 
this point defines the magnitude where capital 
is unlimiting. 
Fig, 6, Income possibility curves for alternative levels of cash rent 
on hay with a t:fllical crop-share-cash lease. 
Under the assumed level of management and 
price expectations, crops have investment priority 
at low levels of capital. Up to $5,247 (P4 ) it 
appears more convenient to invest in rotations 
while gradually increasing their level of fertili-
zation. After P 4, livestock enterprises become 
profitable, and their proportion of total returns 
while all others are held constant.44 Here, oper-
•• This modification to the simplex &<>Iution is described in an article by 
Candler. op. cit, The adaptation of this method to the present study 
Is summarized in Appendix A. 






















Rotations Hogs (acres) (litters) 
168 CSbCOM, 0 
168 CSbCOM. 0 
168 CCSb. 0 
168 CCSb. 0 
168 CCSba 24 
168 CCSb. 24 
42 CCSha :14 
128 CSbt:OM. 
30 CCSha 24 
56 CCOM. 
80 CSbCOM. 




















































Fig. 7. Optimum farm plans for an owner-operator under variable capItal restrictions. 
becomes increasingly greater as the point at which 
capital is not limiting is approached. At high 
levels of operating captial, pasture-fed calves enter 
the farm plan as the most profitable enterprise. 
This induces a modification in the type of rotations 
to meet the forage requirements for the increased 
number of livestock. 
The farm plans at the various capital levels 
represent the profit-maximizing plans for a situ-
ation of owner-operatorship. Thus, they constitute 
the norm to be achieved under alternative tenure 
arrangements and, specifically, alternative leases. 
OPTIMUM FARM PLANS UNDER 
CROP-SHARE-CASH LEASE 
The optimum farm plans with variable capital 
have been computed for both the landlord's and 
the tenant's profit-maximizing programs. The 
comparison between the optimum farm plans as-
sociated with maximization of returns for the 
landlord and the tenant provides useful insight 
into the agreement between the two parties at 
each capital level and a comparison with capital 
levels and total returns under owner-operator-
ship. 
Tenant's optimum farm plans under a typical 
crop-share-cash lease are summarized in table 12 
and shown graphically in fig. 8. Table 13 and 
fig. 9 contain landlord's optimum plans and as-
sociated levels of capital. 
A comparative analysis of the two situations 
shows clearly the relevant role played by the 
total amount of operating capital and the quotas 
contributed by each party in the efficient use of 
·the fj~eg bundle of resources. Tenant's optimum 
plans, given the division of crops specified by the 
typical lease, show a priority of investment in 
livestock enterprises even at low capital levels. 
This is in contrast to the typical situation in 
soils such as the Clarion-Webster where opti-
mum farm plans call for capital use in crops 
before livestock. The first capital optimum under 
the tenant's optimum plans implies high levels 
of capital investment from both parties ($1,005 
from the landlord and $7,785 from the tenant). 
In the landlord's optimum plans, vice versa, be-
fore reaching such a level of capital investments 
there are two plans requiring only $294 (P1 ) and 
$717 (P2 ) from the landlord. This would explain 
the relatively small amount of capital (around 
$500) contributed in practice by the landlord 
under the typical crop-share-cash lease. The con-
trast between landlord's and tenant's requirements 
of capital throws light on the conflicts between 
the parties of the lease. It is evident that the 
small quantities of landlord's capital sufficient to 
arrive at the landlord's first and second capital 
optima are too restrictive for the tenant's first 
optimum plan. 
To compare more closely and to formulate 
suggestions about the optimum proportional con-
tributions of capital by both parties, the levels of 
capital requirements associated with tenant's and 
landlord's optimum plans have been graphed in 
fig. 10. Landlord's capital is represented on the 
horizontal axis and that of the tenant on the 
vertical axis. The capital to be contributed by 
each party according to landlord's and tenant's 
optimum plans are plotted to form two capital 
requirement curves. Each curve specifies the 
quantity of capital that the other party has to 
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TABLE 12. TENANT'S OPTIMUM FARM PROGRAMS UNDER THE TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASE, 1955. 
Farm programs Total Landlord's .Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's 
and capital capital capital c.pital return return return Rotation Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (dollarb) (dolla.·s) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters) (number) resources 
1 8,788 !,OO5 7,783 9,150 4,309 4,821 159 CGSb. 24 0 Capital 
Hog housing 
2 9,098 1.063 8,030 9,527 4,580 4,1147 168 CCSb. .l4 0 CapItal 
Hog housing 
Land 
a 9,574 l,06H 8,506 9,735 4,580 5,155 168 CCSb. ~4 4 Capital 
Hog housing 
Land 

































Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's 
capital return return return Rotation (dollars) (dollars) (doliars) (dollars) (acres) 
2,835 4,180 3,382 789 168 CCOM, 
3.70~ 6,046 4,210 1,835 168 CCSb. 
4,178 6,720 4,580 2,140 168 CCSb. 
4,558 6,773 4,623 2,150 168 CCSb. 
p. 
Fig. 8. Optimum farm plans for the tenant in a typical crop-ahare-cash lease under variable capital re-
strictions. 
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Hogs Calves Limiting 
(litters) (number) resourceS 
0 0 Capital 
Land 
0 0 Capital 
Land 
0 0 Capital 
Land 
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Fig. 9 Optimum farm plans for the landlord in a typical crop-share-



















TENANT'S CAPITAL. ~T 
LANDL.ORD'S CAPITAL.(OOLLARS) 
+ o 00 ~oo l,agO 
Fig. 10, Landlord'. and tenant's capital requirement curVes for re-
spective optimum plans in a typical crop-share lease, 
contribute to achieve a specified capital optimum. 
The capital optima are labeled as in the previous 
figures with subscripts specifying landlord's and 
tenant's optima. For example, P2L refers to the 
second capital optimum for the landlord, while 
PST indicates the fifth capital optimum for the 
tenant. 
The space above the landlord's capital require-
ment curve indicates feasible amounts of tenant's 
capital, while the spa'Ce below contains quantities 
too restricting to achieve the landlord's optimum. 
Analogously, the space to the right of the tenant's 
capital requirement curve includes feasible quan-
tities of landlord's capital, whereas the quan-
tities to the left of the curve are insufficient 
for the tenant's optimum plans. It becomes 
possible, on the basis of the capital requirements 
of both parties, to determine the respective quan-
tities of capital which would eliminate conflicts 
in the use of operating capital within the farm. 
As indicated in fig. 10, the capital associated 
with PaL permits the achievement of P2T and 
P3T ; similarly, the quantity of landlord's capital 
required by P4L permits the attainment of P 4T 
and P 5T. Both P lL and P 2L would become sources 
of conflict between the landlord and the tenant, 
because the amount of landlord's capital is too 
limited to at";ain even the first optimum plan of 
the tenant. 
In conclusion, it appears that, given the level 
of technology, quantities of fixed resources, level 
of management and price expectations assumed 
in this study, to eliminate the intratemporal con-
flict between the two parties in the typical crop-
share-cash lease, the landlord's contribution of 
capital ought not to be inferior to the quantity 
required by P3T ($1,068). Assuming that the 
landlord has to borrow the capital on the market, 
both plans would appear to be profitable since 
P3L and P4I• give marginal net returns to capital 
of $1.08 and $0.13, respectively. In practice, these 
rates will be discounted for risk and uncertainty 
but, even then, it is likely that both PaL and 
P 4L would be profitable for the landlord. 
The comparison between the efficiency of the 
typical crop-share lease with the owner-operated 
situation is shown in a later section when all 
the alternative leases considered are compared 
simultaneously with the norm. 
OPTIMUM FARM PLANS UNDER MODIFIED 
CROP-SHARE LEASE 
A set of incentive conditions for attaining 
efficiency and equity has been advanced in the 
literature dealing with the problem of resource 
allocation in leasing arrangements.45 Of the 
four incentive conditions, two deal specifically 
with the problem of intra temporal resource al-
location. They state that: (1) The share of the 
factor of variable input must be the same as the 
share of output of product obtained from it. (2) 
The shares of all products must be the same. 
The empirical investigations dealing with these 
" See Hurlburt, op. cit., p, St.. 
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conditions have been restricted thus far to 
ascertaining the extent of their existence in 
representative types of leases. The previous sec-
tions of this study have indicated the impact on 
intrafirm efficiency when the division of costs 
and benefits is not based on these conditions. 
Attention now turns to determining the effect 
on efficiency and sharing of income when these 
two incentive conditions are applied to the typical 
crop-share lease.46 
Tenant's and landlord's optimum plans are pre-
sented in tables 14 and 15 and illustrated graphi-
cally in figs. 11 and 12. 
The modifications in the sharing rules engender 
an agreement between the parties on the farm 
plans to be adopted even at low levels of capital. 
For the tenant, because of the reduced amount 
of capital he has to contribute to each crop enter-
prise, investment in livestock at low capital levels 
loses priority with respect to rotations and fertili-
zer. Investment in livestock takes place only 
when total capital has increased to $9,046 (Ps). 
The last plan, P 9, involves a decrease in total 
return because of the sizable fall in landlord's 
return and the slight increment in tenant's in-
come. This plan, however, is nonprofitable from 
'0 A description of the specific arrangement. of this modification Is given 
In table 4. 
the point of view of the farm as a unit, and it is 
likely that both parties will agree on adopting 
the preceding plan, P 8. 
The second impact of the incentive conditions 
is a decrease in every plan in the share of returns 
going to the landlord. This fall in landlord's in-
come is accompanied by an increase in the pro-
portion of capital he has to contribute. 
The capital requirement curves connected with 
this lease are presented in fig. 13. The first four. 
optimum plans for both parties call for identical 
amounts of capital, thus eliminating the pos-
sibility of conflicts within the firm regarding 
the allocation of capital to the fixed resources. 
The fourth landlord's optimum plan provides 
sufficient capital to permit the achievement of 
tenant's fifth and sixth plan. Similarly, landlord's 
last plan (P5d corresponds to tenant's seventh 
and eighth plans. 
In conclusion, this modified crop-share lease 
eliminates the conflicts in allocation of resources 
present in a typical crop-share contract. It is 
unlikely, however, that a landlord will be willing 
to adopt this lease because of reduction of his 
income and greater involvement in production 
risk and uncertainty through an increase in his 
share of capital. Once high levels of capital have 
been reached, probably a livestock-share lease 
would appear convenient for the landlord. 
TABLE 14. TENANT'S OPTIMUM PROGRAMS UNDER THE MODIFIED CROP-SHARE LEASE, 1956. 
Farm programs Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's 
and capital capital capital capital return return return Rotation Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (doUars) (acres) (litters) (number) resources 
1 2,950 1,475 1,475 4,534 2,267 2,267 168 CSbCOMl 0 0 Capital Land 
~ 3,460 1,730 1.730 5,154 2,577 2,577 168 CSbCOM. 0 0 Capital Land 
3 . 4,420 2,210 2,210 6,044 3,022 3,022 168 CCSb, 0 0 Capital Land 
4 5,246 2.624 2,629 6,720 3,360 3,360 168 CCSb, 0 0 Capital Land 
5 9,046 2,624 6,422 9,690 3,360 6,220 168 CCSb. 24 0 Capital Land 
.Hog housing 
6 9,501 2,624 6,577 9,810 3,360 6,450 168 CCSb, 24 4 Capital Land 
Hog housing 
Corn 
7 10,73"1 2,972 7,765 10,135 3,356 6,749 16& CCSh. 24 8 Capital Land 
.Hog housing 
Cash 




9 12,745 2,698 10,030 9,791 2,895 6,694 10 CCSb. 7 52 Capital 




TABLE 15. LANDLORD'S OPTlMUM PROGRAMS UNDER THE MODIFIED CROP-SHARE LEASE, 1955. 
Farm programs Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord'. Tenant's 
and capital capital capital capital return return return Rotation Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollar.) (dollars) (acres) (Jitters) (number) resources 
1 2,1150 1,475 1,475 4.634 2,267 2,267 1611 CSbCOMl 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2 3,460 1,730 1,730 5,154 2,577 2,577 168 CSbCOM. 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3 4,420 2,210 2,:nO 6,044 3,022 3,022 168 CCSb, 0 0 Capital 
Land 
4 5,248 2,624 2,624 6,720 3,360 3,360 168 CCSb. 0 0 Capital 
Land 
























Fig. 11. Optimum farm plans for 
the tenant in a modified crop-share 
lea.e under variable capital restric-
tions. 
o 5 .. 400 7,'200 9,000 10,800 
CAPITAL (DOLL.ARS) 
OPTIMUM FARM PLANS UNDER LIVESTOCK-SHARE 
LEASE 
In a livestock-share contract, the equal sharing 
of benefits and costs between the two parties 
of the lease is not limited to the crop enterprises 
but also includes the livestock activities which 
enter the farm plan,47 
















2,000 4,000 (00.000 8.000 
CAPITAL- (COLLARS) 
Fig. 12. Optimum farm plans for the landlord in a modified crop-
















Fig. 13. Landlord's and tenant's cspital requirement curves for respec-
tive optimum plans in a modified crop-share lease 
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TABLE 16. TENANT'S AND LANDLORD'S OPTIMUM PROGRAMS UNDER A TYPICAL LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE, 1955. 
Farm programs Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's 
and oap.tal capital capital capital return return 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
1 2,950 1,475 1,475 4,534 2.267 
2 3.460 1.730 1.7all 5.154 2.577 
3 4.420 2.210 2.210 6.046 3.023 
4 5.248 2,624 2.624 6.720 3.360 
5 9,046 4,523 4,523 9,580 4,790 
6 10,GOO 5,300 5.300 10,364 5,182 
14,158 'i,079 7.079 11,634 5,817 
8 15,000 7,500 7.~00 11,822 5,911 
y 15,206 ',,60~ 7.603 11,864 5,932 
This rental arrangement brings about a com-
plete agreement between landlord and tenant in 
the intratemporal allocation of resources. The 
agreement exists at all capital levels, as indicated 
by the data in table 16, illustrated in fig. 14. 
The selection of farm plans is identical to the 
one obtained under a situation of owner-operator-
ship. Capital investment in crop enterprises and 
fertilizer have priority over the livestock activities 
which enter the plan only when the total capital 
available is greater than $5,248. Hogs are the 
more profitable livestock enterprise up to $9,000 
of capital. Beef cattle then enter the plan, modi-
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return Rotation Hogs Calves Limiting 
(dollars) (acres) (litters) (number) resources 
2.267 168 CSbCOM, 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2.577 168 CSbCOM, 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3.023 168 CCSb, 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3,360 168 CCSb. 0 0 Capital 
Land 
4,790 168 CCSb. ~4 0 Land 
Capital 
Hog housing 




5.817 42 CCSb, ~t 50 Land 
125 CSbCOM, Capital 
Hog housing 
Corn, Hay 




5,982 30 CCSb. 24 58 Land 
85 CSbCOM. C"pital 
Corn 
52 CCOM, Hog housing 
May-June labor 
creased feed requirements, Finally, at P9 further 
application of capital would not increase total 
return because the fixed resources (land, labor 
and livestock housing) become restrictive, and 
only a change in their quantities would permit 
expansion of output. 
COMPARISON OF OPTIMUM PROGRAMS 
The discussion in the previous sections has 
been focused on the conflict between the land-
lord and the tenant within a specified lease. 
To test the over-all efficiency of the leasing 
arrangements considered here, the optimum plans 
Fig, 14. Landlord's and tenant's 
optimum plans In a livestock-share 









L.IVESTOCK- SHARE L.EASE 
OPTIMUM PLANS 
t? ... 
MODIFIED CROP-SHARE LEASE 
TENANT'S OPTIMUM PL."NS 
Fig, 15. Optimum farm plans for 
alternative tenure arrangements un-
der variable capital restrictions. 
a: 
~ 
TYPICAL. CR.OP-SHARE LEASE 
LANDL.ORD'S OPTIMUM PL.ANS 
iii a: 4,000 
2,000 
0~-----L------~-----~-OOL-0----78,~00~O-----IO~.O~O-O--~1~2.~OO~O~--~~---2,000 4,000 ... 
CAPITAL (DOLLARS) 
of each party of a lease are compared with the 
plans attainable under owner-operatorship. For 
clarity of illustration, the relationship between 
capital and returns for each situation is illustrated 
graphically in fig, 15. 
The figure indicates coincidence between opti-
mum plans of owner-operatorship and livestock-
share lease, The association between benefits 
and costs guaranteed by the terms of the live-
stock-share lease eliminates the intratemporal 
inefficiencies connected with the sharing of in-
puts and outputs, 
The modified crop-share lease induces the opti-
mum plans of both parties to coincide with those 
of the owner-operator up to the point at which 
the livestock enterprises are introduced into the 
plan. In the last plans, there is a reduction in 
efficiency, as shown graphically by a deviation 
of the lines representing landlord's and tenant's 
optimum plans in the modified crop-share lease 
from the owner-operator's curve. 
The deviation from the owner-operator curve 
is greater in the case of the typical crop-share 
lease. At low levels of capital, the inefficiency 
is particularly conspicuous; it decreases consider-
ably when the amount of capital is increased. 
Tangency with the owner-operator's curve is at-
tained only at the third optimum plan for the 
landlord, The tenant's curve, even though it 
approaches the owner-operator's curve, never 
achieves tangency because of the intrafirm cost 
transfers induced by the cash rent on hay. 
This comparative analysis, focused on efficiency, 
permits selection of the most efficient arrange-
ments given certain restrictions on the amount 
of capital available, and selection of optimum 
quantities of capital, given a specific lease. The 
illustrations of these twofold advantages con-
nected with the analysis are evident from the 
preceding tables and figures. 
It is obvious, however, that efficiency both 
within and between leases is not the only criterion 
to determine the practical selection of a given 
rental contract. The sharing of income connected 
with each lease definitely will influence the type 
of contract that both landlord and tenant will 
be willing to accept. It is thus reasonable to 
expect that the typical crop-share lease will not 
be easily abandoned by landlords because of the 
higher proportion of total return connected with 
it. This is particularly relevant at low levels of 
landlord's capital. The previous analysis, how-
ever, provides useful suggestions on the capital 
arrangements between parties even when the 
typical crop-share lease is maintained. At higher 
capital levels, the livestock-share lease becomes 
more profitable to both parties and is likely to 
be adopted. 
POSSIBLE USES AND EXTENSION 
OF RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
MAXIMIZING PRODUCTIVITY OF RESOURCES 
Efficiency, that is attainment of maximum 
value product from a given bundle of resources, 
has been assumed to be the goal commonly pursued 
by both landlord and tenant in the leases con-
sidered in this study. Nevertheless, it is realistic 
to expect that, within a certain range, both parties 
are actually concerned with maximization of their 
individual returns from the stock of available 
resources. Conflicts between these two alter-
native positions, not necessarily present from a 
theoretical standpoint, arise in practice because 
of (1) qualitative distribution of resources be-
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tween individuals and (2) customary and tra-
ditional ways to contribute resources and share 
returns. With respect to the former, if both 
landlord and tenant owned and contributed some 
portion of all the resources, the application of 
conditions leading to both individual and over-all 
efficiency would follow naturally. But when the 
distribution of resources between individuals is 
such, as in our society, that ownership is fairly 
well specialized so that leases are actually based 
on lumpy contributions of different resources 
and only a few resources are contributed in com-
mon, achieving efficiency becomes a more in-
volved problem. The main difficulty stems from 
the fact that each party would consider the re-
sources contributed by the other party as a vari-
able factor applied to his stock of fixed resources. 
Since recommendations about eventual dissatis-
faction with the pattern of resource ownership 
among individuals fall outside the area of concern 
of the research worker, suggestions about ef-
ficiency in leasing arrangements must refer to 
the most appropriate contribution of fixed re-
sources by landlords and tenants and modifications 
in current leasing provisions. 
In the first area, the problem is the one of 
determining the size of the economic unit to be 
organized through leasing. The norm to be 
achieved is contributions of resources of a quality 
and quantity that would be achieved by an 
entrepreneur in traditional firm analysis. In 
other words, the conditions regulating achieve-
ment of production equilibrium in the firm also 
would apply in determining the quantities of re-
sources to be contributed by landlord and tenant. 
Basically, -the criterion which determines the 
quantity of each factor to be used in the firm is 
equation of the marginal value product with the 
market price. In practice, resources are owned 
in a discrete manner which makes the possibilities 
of substitution between factors relatively limited. 
This criterion, however, may be approximated. 
Intersectoral mobility of resources is relevant and 
cannot be excluded from consideration in deter-
mining optimum farm size. 
The initial contribution of fixed resources by 
landlord and tenant is essential for the use and 
productivity of variable resources and the final 
achievement of efficiency. The institutional en-
vironment has established relatively inflexible 
provisions for sharing costs and benefits, re-
gardless of the quantitie3 and productivities of 
the various resources. In the light of these 
considerations, research devoted to efficiency in 
leasing arrangements ought to be directed toward 
(1) determining optimum combinations of fixed 
resources and (2) suggesting leasing provisions 
which would not lead to conflicts between parties 
on allocation of resources and which would result 
in a production structure similar to the one 
characteristic under unified resource ownership 
and control. 
Optimum allocation of resources under a situ-
ation of unified ownership and control is attained 
through the application of the four conditions for 
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leasing efficiency as specified in the literature.48 
These conditions per se are not sufficient to 
guarantee achievement of efficiency, however, 
since they are concerned exclusively with allo-
cation of costs and benefits after the fixed re-
sources have been committed. Efficiency con-
ditions apply only to short-run allocation problems 
and cannot obviate possible distortions stemming 
from the combination of fixed resources. 
Research on efficiency in farm leasing has only 
recently abandoned the descriptive approach and 
is attempting investigations of a more analytical 
nature. The process, however, is long and in-
volved. Establishment of norms (unified owner-
ship and control) and efficiency conditions rep-
resent only the frame within which to operate. 
This study is an initial attempt to suggest 
methodological procedures and investigate em-
pirical relationships between types of cases and 
quantities of resources available in rented farms. 
The empirical section just presented has shown, 
for instance, that conflict between landlord and 
tenant in a typical share lease about the selection 
of the intratemporal farm program disappears 
when certain levels of operating capital become 
available. To be able to make empirical recom-
mendations, the investigation must be extended 
to other situations with respect to the availability 
of resources and to the degree of control of them 
by both parties. A complete investigation would 
require the analysis of the two continua: (1) 
quantity and quality of resources and (2) degree 
of ownership and control on the resources and 
their allocation. Empirical knowledge of the 
range and frequency distribution of these two 
populations would permit the formation of a 
composite population which would include the 
characteristics of both continua. Selection and 
detailed study of cases throughout the resulting 
population would render greater reliability to the 
empirical recommendations. 
SHARING INCOME AND RESOURCE CONTRIBUTIONS 
Efficiency of resource use is only one side of 
the economic problem of farm leasing. Distribu-
tion of revenue within the firm between the 
leasing parties is another crucial aspect, strictly 
related to the problem of efficiency. The di-
vergency between distribution of revenue and 
efficiency is induced by the rigidity of customary 
sharing provisions, as compared with the relative 
variability of resource contributions. Rigid leasing 
arrangements obviously cannot be appropriate 
for the variety of resource contributions, both 
quantitative and qualitative. The inflexibility 
of sharing provisions is partly understandable. 
This applies specifically to cases in which one 
of the fixed resources is present in such a quantity 
that its marginal product is not significantly 
different from zero. Therefore, it is necessary 
also from the distributive standpoint to investigate 
the two continua, quantity of resources and de-
gree of ownership and control, to gain a more 
accurate understanding of the impact of insti-
•• Hurlburt, op. cit., P. 86. 
tutional arrangements on economic aspects of 
leasing. 
Application of the incentive conditions for ef-
ficiency in leasing also determines the pattern 
of distribution of revenue within the firm, but, 
as from the efficiency point of view, possible 
dis equalities originating from initial contribution 
of fixed resources are not taken into account. 
This confirms the need to investigate, over the 
populations of leases and quantities of resources, 
the relationships among revenues forthcoming 
from customary sharing provisions and those 
which would exist if other subdivisions on the 
basis of marginal products were applied. 
RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN LANDLORD 
AND TENANT 
The empirical section of this study has shown 
the presence of conflicts between the parties of 
the lease induced by customary leasing provisions. 
Conflicts originate from the fact that different 
production programs maximize returns for the 
landlord and the tenant. At the same time, 
intermediate positions between the two extremes 
also may be feasible. Strictly from an efficiency 
standpoint, the position involving the largest 
total return is identified by the point of tangency 
of a 45° line to the income possibility curve. 
The distributive aspect of the lease brings about 
some difficulties because of the contrasting posi-
tions that landlord and tenant would select along 
the income possibility curve. The relationship 
is highly analogous to the one characteristic of 
bilateral monopoly, where the position involving 
the largest value of the sum of the returns of 
the two parties is identifiable, but the sharing of 
the total return is d~cided through bargaining. 
Movements from one corner to another along the 
income possibility curve could become feasible 
in the cases in which the increase in total income 
were sufficiently large to allow compensation to 
the losing party. Conflicts of this nature are as-
sociated with customary leasing provisions. 
Improvement of leasing arrangements, in the 
sense of eliminating conflicts between the parties, 
has to be pursued through appropriate modifi-
cations of contributions of costs and reception of 
benefits. Application of the incentive conditions, 
accompanied by the necessary adjustments in 
variable and fixed resources, would eliminate 
disagreements between the parties on the farm 
program to be adopted. Abandonment of cus-
tomary and traditional arrangements is not easily 
induced, however, because of the necessary re-
adjustment in sharing of returns and resource 
contribution. It is likely that the party negatively 
affected by the modification would call on insti-
tutional inflexibility of leases to maintain the 
status quo. 
Also in this area, future research might be 
efficiently directed toward examining over the 
two continua the degree of conflicts between the 
parties of the lease. Adjustments needed at various 
levels of the two continua (quantity of resources 
and degree of ownership and control) might be 
proficiently pointed out, thus providing landlords 
and tenants with a more complete, accurate frame-
work of information on which to base decisions. 
FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTED BY STUDY 
This study might be considered as an initial 
step in a series of investigations into the manifold 
economic aspects of farm leasing. Expansion of 
the present study may consist of various sections 
which are briefly described. 
EFFECTS OF VARIATION IN PRICES AND COSTS 
Variation in prices of products and factors of 
production considerably affects return expecta-
tions of both landlords and tenants and, conse-
quently, the extent of agreement about the farm 
program to be adopted. While this is theoretically 
evident, it is not easy to predict the concrete 
impact of price fluctuations on leasing. A more 
accurate knowledge could be attained by extend-
ing the approach used in the present study and 
determining the reaction of alternative leasing 
arrangements to variations in prices. The modi-
fied simplex solution allowing for price vari-
ability could be profitably used in analyzing this 
aspect of leasing.49 This technique could be com-
bined with the modification to the simplex solu-
tion suggested in this study and with the pro-
cedure allowing variation in operating capital. 
Knowledge of the reaction of landlord and tenant 
to changes in prices under alternative leasing 
provisions would be a further contribution to the 
problem of intertemporal allocation of resources 
in leasing arrangements. The study of reaction 
to price variation should also be performed for 
representative cases throughout the two continua. 
INTERTEMPORAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Intertemporal resource allocation includes prob-
lems stemming from tenure uncertainty and al-
location of resources over time. Little empirical 
work has been undertaken in this relatively new 
field. 50 More information is needed about the 
subjective discount rate attached by tenants to 
tenure uncertainty and consequent patterns of 
preference of investment between time periods. 
Information of this nature could also be collected 
while investigating the two continua of resource 
availability and degree of resource control. Once 
empirical knowledge about discount rates becomes 
available and, therefore, input-output coefficients 
adjustable accordingly. representative situations 
out of the two continua could be programmed over 
time. Eventual deviation in efficiency and con-
flict between parties engendered by alternative 
systems of allocating resources over time could 
thus be pointed out. This segment of analysis 
•• See Candler, Wilfred. A modified simplex solution for linear 
programming with variable prices. Jour. Farm Econ. 39:409·428. 1957. 
50 See Smitb, Wesley G. Dynamic linear programming of conservation 
alternative.. including household consumption. Unpublished Ph D 
thesi.. Iowa State University Library, A,?es. 1958: and Loft.ga~: 
Laurel D. Linear programming of dynamIC plans for an actual farm 
and household. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Iowa State University Li. 
brnry, Ames. 1958. 
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would be the complement of the investigation on 
intratemporal allocation initiated by this study. 
Customary leasing provisions could then be wholly 
evaluated and confronted with alternative ar-
rangements in terms of efficiency and conflicts 
between parties. 
ANALYSIS OF FIXED RESOURCE CONTRIBUTIONS 
Intratemporal problems refer only to allocation 
of variable resources to the bundle of fixed re-
sources contributed by both parties. As mentioned 
previously, however, proportions and total amount 
of fixed resources are essential elements for the 
achievement of long-term efficiency. 
Analysis of optimum contributions of fixed 
resources may be performed by applying linear 
programming with variable resource restriction. 
The procedure which, in this study, has been 
applied to capital may be used to determine 
changes in farm programs and variation of mar-
ginal return to all the fE.sources limiting the 
production possibility of the firm. The criterion 
of relating the marginal return of each resource 
to its market price would indicate the optimum 
quantity of each factor to be used by the firm 
and, therefore, to be contributed by the parties. 
INSTITUTIONS AS FACILITATING AND OBSTRUCTING 
FACTORS 
Both this study and those previously suggested 
have been based on the fundamental assumption 
that achievement of efficiency is the major and 
common objective pursued by landlord and tenant. 
It is reasonable to expect, however, that in practice 
actions of both parties are guided and motivated 
by many factors besides "maximization of re-
turns." Observance of institutional arrangements 
plays an essential role in the determination of 
rental contracts and in guiding and controlling 
their rate of change over time. While it is out-
side the competence of the research worker to 
modify institutional arrangements directly. his 
main function is to provide the parties involved 
with information about the loss or the gain in 
terms of alternative objectives when institutional 
arrangements are adopted. The framework with-
in which decisions are made by landlords and 
tenants would then become more complete. Lack 
of knowledge, if not abolished, will be eminently 
decreased. . 
SUMMARY 
This report presents methodological proce-
dures for analyzing the impact of alternative farm 
tenure arrangements on intrafirm resource al-
location. The linear programming technique was 
used to determine optimum farm plans for intra-
temporal use of resources under owner-operator-
ship and alternative kinds of farm leases. The 
simplex method of solution was modified to attain 
maximum net returns to the parties of the lease 
with the solution of one simplex tableau. This 
modified solution was used to test inherent con-
flicts between landlord and tenant operating a 
particular farm in north-central Iowa under vari-
ous forms of leases found in the area. 
The tests were based on the specific assumption 
that both parties desire to maximize their net 
income from the use of a particular bundle of 
resources. In applying the modified simplex 
solution for linear programming, variable capital 
restrictions were employed to determine quantities 
of operating capital to be contributed by both 
parties to the lease. Major attention was focused 
on the crop-share-cash lease since it was the most 
prevalent form of lease in the area. The analysis 
also extended to owner-operatorship, livestock-
share leasing and certain variations in leasing 
provisions. 
Results of the study are summarized under the 
following four tests. 
Test No. 1 concerns inefficiency in allocation of 
resources under customary provisions of leases. 
The optimum farm plan derived for an owner-
operator situation was selected as the norm with 
which landlord's and tenant's optimum plans were 
compared. An ex post analysis was made for the 
period 1951-55. Results revealed that the crop-
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share-cash lease arrangement did not meet the 
efficiency conditions. Each year, aggregate land-
lord and tenant net returns were less than net 
returns under the owner-operator optimum plan. 
With the exception of 1952, landlord's and tenant's 
programs did not coincide. These results lead to 
the conclusion that resource allocation according 
to provisions of existing crop-share-cash leases 
brings less efficient use of the bundle of re-
sources than would be the result under owner-
operatorship. Both landlord's and tenant's opti-
mum plans leave part of the tenant's capital idle 
as a consequence of the limited capital contributed 
by the landlord. 
Major conflicts between landlord's and tenant's 
plans arose in the selection of the rotation and in 
the level of fertilization. The most profitable 
landlord's plan included that rotation and that 
fertilizer level which provided him the highest 
return for dollars invested by him. Available 
landlord capital, however, did not provide suf-
ficient operating capital for the optimum level of 
fertilizer for either the tenant or the owner-
operator. On the other hand, feeding require-
ments for livestock enterprises induced selection 
of a rotation and fertilizer level under the tenant's 
plan which complemented his livestock program. 
Test No.2 concerns effects of operating capital 
on optimum landlord, tenant. and owner-operator 
plans. Marginal returns to operating capital were 
computed for optimum plans of each. Under 
owner-operators hip. operating capital was a re-
stricting resource throughout the period. Mar-
ginal net returns varied from $0.63 to $0.36 be-
cause of changes in quantity of capital available 
and prices of products. Under the landlord's op-
timum plan, the marginal return to the landlord 
for his operating capital varied from $1.11 to 
$1.95, while under the tenant's optimum plan 
landlord's marginal returns varied from $1.64 to 
-$1.11. For the two plans, comparable net re-
turns to the tenant varied from $2.44 to -$3.93 
and from $2.44 to $0.43, respectively. Thus, 
landlord and tenant returns from operating capital 
varied widely from landlord's to tenant's optimum 
plan. 
Test No. 3 involves optimum amounts of oper-
ating capital to be contributed by the parties in 
order to eliminate conflicts stemming from ap-
plication of this variable resource to the bundle 
of fixed factors. The analysis was performed for 
resources available on the case farm in 1955 and 
for .expected prices the same year. Comparison 
of optimum landlord and tenant plans under vari-
able capital restrictions led to the determination 
of capital requirement curves. The curve for 
each party specifies the amount of capital to be 
contributed by the other party if the optimum 
plan would be implemented. The comparison of 
the landlord's and tenant's capital requirement 
curves defined the ranges of capital at which 
there is agreement between the optimum plans 
of the two parties. Interpretation of the capital 
requirement curves revealed that conflicts stem-
ming from amounts and allocations of operating 
capital would be eliminated if the landlord's con-
tributions were at least $1,068. Thus, reserve 
allocation conflicts between parties would be 
eliminated if the landlord increased his contri-
bution of operating capital around $500 as a 
minimum determined by the capital requirement 
curves. Under this adjustment, returns from 
the optimum plan remained slightly lower than 
for the owner-operator optimum. This was caused 
by interenterprise cost transfers engendered by 
the distortion in cost structure associated with 
the payment of cash rent for hay land. 
Test No. 4 concerned application of Hicksian 
factor-factor and factor-product interrelationships 
as incentive conditions to the sharing of costs 
and returns. Modifications in the sharing pro-
visions of leases toward equal shares of variable 
inputs and of the products, induces agreement 
between the parties on farm plans-even at low 
levels of capital. Identity is attained between 
the landlord's and tenant's capital requirement 
curves. In addition, optimum plans of both parties 
coincide with optimum plans for the owner-oper-
ator to the level of capital where livestock ac-
tivities enter the plan. At this point, cash rent 
on meadow and pasture land again causes intra-
firm cost transfers and induces a distortion in 
the cost structure of livestock enterprises re-
sulting in decreased efficiency. However, opti-
mum plans under livestock-share leases were 
identical with owner-operators when program-
ming with variable capital restriction was applied. 
Extension of this study toward more compre-
hensive analysis of efficiency and equity in leases 
could proceed as follows: 
First, study effects of variation in product 
prices on efficiency and conflicts between parties 
to the lease. Linear programming modified to 
allow variation in prices would appear to provide 
a valuable technique of analysis. 
Second, study the impact of lease-engendered 
intertemporal conflicts on efficiency and equity. 
This area of investigation is complex and con-
cerns tenure uncertainty and resource allocation 
over time. Dynamic programming might provide 
a useful technique of analysis. 
Third, study combinations of fixed resources 
contributed by landlord and tenant. Linear pro-
gramming with variable resource restrictions 
could be used in this analysis. 
Fourth, study provisions of leases rooted in 
custom and tradition in terms of economic con-
sequences. This inquiry could provide results 
of economic sacrifices associated with particular 
lease provisions. Thus, landlords and tenants 
could consider altering customary lease provisions 
in light of the associated consequences. 
APPENDIX A: MODIFIED SIMPLEX SOLUTION TO DETERMINE THE 
OPTIMUM PLAN IN A RENTED FARM 
To determine optimum plans for landlord and 
tenant with a single programming solution, a 
modification of the simplex solution has been 
introduced. Table A-1 contains a schematic pres-
entation of the modified simplex tableau. Since 
the purpose of the table is exclusively illustrative, 
only the iterations essential for understanding 
the procedure have been included. The activities 
and resources used in the simplex solution are 
specified in table A-2. Symbols used for identify-
ing each item in the solution are identified in this 
table. 
In the initial iteration, the only difference with 
respect to the usual tableau is the division of the 
rows on the basis of the resource contribution by 
landlord and tenant to each activity and to the 
total resource supply. For example, in table A-1 
the row of operating capital, which is the only 
resource to be contributed by both landlord and 
tenant in the lease under consideration, is di-
vided into the landlord capital row and the tenant 
capital row (Pm and PlOT, respectively). Similar-
ly, the net income row (Zj - Cj) has been divided 
into the landlord and tenant net income rows 
(Zj - CjL and ZJ - CjT, respectively). 
To solve the matrix, the tenant net income 
row is chosen as the vector to be maximized, and 
the activity with the largest negative net price 
becomes the incoming activity (P13 in the at-
tached example, since -79.72 is the largest nega-
tive net price in the tenant's row). The solution 
proceeds as in the standard simplex method until 
all the elements of the tenant's net income row 
have become positive (iteration X in table A-1). 
This indicates that the tenant, who has been the 
decision-maker, has selected the plan which will 
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TABLE A-l. SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF A SIMPLEX SOLUTION MODIFIED TO DETERMINE OPTIMUM PLANS FOR A 
RENTED FARM." 
Resource 
ltera- 'l4Pply Disposals Activities 
tions .1:'. P,. P,G!. PlOT p,. P, P. P. P13 P .. 
P,. 160 1 0 0 0 3 4 5 0 0 
P,sL 625 0 1 0 0 6.62 6.62 10.92 0 0 
P,GT 175 0 Q 1 0 60.03 59.07 '/2.44 161.38 137.44 
P,. 1.680 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70.4 0 
p .. 57 0 0 0 C 0 -1.0 -1.9 0.81 1.6 
P .. 0 0 0 0 1 -0.36 -62.06 -63.6 125.85 .50 
ZJ - CIT 0 0 0 0 0 -23.49 -22.69 -40.22 -70.72 -41.56 
ZI - CIL 0 0 0 0 0 -57.83 -57.83 -92.86 0 0 
P,. 10.61 
P. 0.75 0.03 
1'. 34.90 
X P,. :062.07 
POI 64.03 
p" 20.14 
ZI- CIT 3.376.19 1.56 0.43 0.46 0.04 5.59 11.19 3.23 0 24.00 
ZI - CJL ... 583.69 -1.18 -1.11 0.72 -0.93 1.20 12.56 0.49 0 53.00 
ql -0.76 -2.58 -22.73 
Ph 9.34 2.68 
P .. 16.06 
P. 37.76 
Xl P .. 268.75 
P,. 61.32 
PlI 20.04 
ZJ - CJT 3.375.53 1.25 0.20 0.49 () 6.23 12.80 3.99 0 26.33 
Z. -CJL 3.598.59 5.9~ 4.22 U lJ -13.25 -24.21 -16.77 0 0 
qJ -2.13 -1.89 -4.20 
P. 3.48 1.02 
P.s 80.92 
P, 47.53 
Xll P .. 298.63 P,. 47.73 
P18 19.62 26.33 Zl - CIT 3.361.63 -U.45 0.61 0.49 0 3.73 8.73 0 0 
ZJ - CJL 3.657.04 13.14 2.48 0 0 -2.74 -7.11 0 0 0 
qJ -0.72 -O.SI 
P' 3.42 Po> 151.58 
P. 48.78 
XIII P,. 808.19 
P •• 47.71 
p" 19.48 0.49 0 -1.64 0 -8.57 0 26.33 ZJ - CIT 3.331.77 -4.10 1.50 
ZJ -CIL 3.681.36 16.11 1.76 0 0 1.6~ 0 6.98 0 0 
• The symbols relating to reSOUrces and activities (PI) are illustrated in table A.2 • All the figures have heen rounded to two decimal places. The 
check rows and columns have been omitted. 
TABLE A-2. LIST OF ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES WITH COR-
RESPONDING SYMBOLS USED IN THE SIMPLEX SOLUTION. 
Item. Symbols 
Adivities 
CCSb, .......................................................................................... p, 
CCSb. .......................................................................................... P. 
CCSb, ...................... ................................................................... Pa 
CCSb. .......................................................................................... P. 
CCOM, ........................................................................................ P. 
CCOM. ................................................... .................................... P. 
CCOMa _...................................................................................... p, 
CCOM. ........................................................................................ P. 
CSbCOM, .................................................................................... P. 
CSbCOM. .......................................... .......................................... P'O 
CSbCOM. .......................... ......................................................... p" 
CSbCOM, .......................................... ......................................... P,. 
Spring hogs .... _.............................. ........................................... P,. 
Pasture-fed calve. ...................................................................... P" 
Resources 
Land .......................................................................................... .. 
t~~~~rd··~;;pit·~i··:::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::: 
Tenant capital ........................................................................... . 
Cattle housing "",." ................................................................ . 





Labor group A ............... ............................................................ P,. 
Lahor group B ............................................................................ P'o 
Labor group C .......................... ................................................. POl 
Labor group D _.......................................................................... Pot 






maximize his income. During this first phase 
of the solution, the landlord net income row has 
been carried along, as any other row, but has never 
been taken into consideration in deciding what 
enterprises to bring into the plan. Hence, enter-
prises with negative net prices might still exist in 
the landlord's row. This indicates that a read-justment of the plan, either by introducing dif-
ferent enterprises or by modifying the level of 
intensity of those now composing the plan, would 
increase the landlord's returns. 
As mentioned earlier, the movement from the 
tenant's to the landlord's optimum combination of 
enterprises may proceed along different paths ac-
cording to the selection of the enterprise to be 
introduced in the following iterations. We are 
particularly interested, however, in those inter-
mediate positions between the two optima which 
form the upper boundary of the feasible combina-
tion of enterprises in the landlord-tenant income 
plane. An initial approximation of the relevant 
boundary may be obtained in introducing, in the 
intermediary iterations between the tenant's and 
the landlord's optimum plans, the enterprise 
which involves the maximum increase in land-
lord's income for each unit of tenant's income 
given up. To this purpose, a new row is intro-
duced (qj), whose elements are obtained by divid-
ing the negative landlord's net price coefficients 
by the corresponding coefficients in the tenant's 
row. 
The largest ratio will indicate the incom-
ing activity which will increase landlord's in-
come and at the same time induce the 
mllllmum decrease in tenant's income. In 
table A-I, -22.73 is the largest ratio in 
iteration X, and, therefore P ~5 becomes the in-
coming activity. In iteration XI, landlord's total 
net income has increased (from $3,583 to $3,598), 
and tenant's income has very slightly decreased 
(from $3,376 to $3,375). The same criterion is fol-
lowed in selecting the incoming activities in itera-
tions XI and XII (-4.20 and -0.81 are the 
largest ratios). Finally, in iteration XIII, all the 
coefficients of the landlord's net income row have 
become positive, thus indicating that the combina-
tion of enterprises and their intensities which 
maximize landlord's net income has been selected. 
Naturally, in going from iteration X to iteration 
XIII-that is, from tenant's net income maxi-
mizing plan to landlord's net income maximizing 
plan - some tenant's net price coefficients will 
change from positive to negative. This indicates 
that the matrix opens the possibility of moving 
back to the optimum position specified by itera-
tion X. The collection of points so obtained, how-
ever, does not necessarily guarantee circumscrip-
tion of all the feasible points between the two 
optima. The correctness of the boundary may be 
checked through the introduction of alternative 
profitable enterprises moving from the tenant's 
optimum position and in the following intermedi-
ary points. 
This trial and error procedure explores the pos-
sible paths of movement from tenant's to land-
lord's optimum and thus tests the correctness of 
the boundary traced previously. With reference 
to table A-I, the check is performed by intro-
ducing PlG (-1.18) and Ple, (-1.11) in iteration 
XI and then exploring all the alternatives stem-
ming from the introduction of these two enter-
l)l'ises. The computational procedure is the stand-
ard one, therefore these iterations are not in-
cluded in table A-I. 
APPENDIX B: INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR CROP ENTERPRISES 
The labor requirements for the crops considered 
in this study and the costs associated with their 
production are presented in tables B-1 through 
B-5. 
The labor requirements have been assumed to 
remain unchanged during the period considered 
in the analysis. The labor coefficients for the 
rotations included in the study can be easily de-
duced, summing the requirements of the crops 
composing one unit of rotation. 
The items of the capital coefficients also have 
been presented on a crop basis. Therefore, the 
operating capital required by each rotation is 
obtained by summing the costs attached to each 
component crop. 
In the programming dealing with leases, the 
capital coefficients of landlord and tenant for 
each rotation are computed by summing land-
lord's and tenant's contribution as specified by 
the rental contract. For example, in the typical 
crop-share lease, landlord's capital coefficient of 
a rotation of corn-com-soybeans at the second 
level of fertilization is obtained by adding half 
the fertilizer expense, half the corn seed expense 
1'..nd the entire expense for soybean seed. The 
tenant's coefficient is computed analogously. 
TABLE B-l. MONTHLY LABOR REQUIREMENTS OF CROPS PER 
ACRE IN MAN·HOURS." 
Months Corn 
Jan. ___________ . __________________ 0 
Feb. _ ..... __ . _________________ .... 0 
March __________ ........ __________ 0 
April ________ ._ ... _______ ....... _0.826 
May ___ ... __________ .. __ .......... 1..i40 
June _____ . __ . ___ ...... ____ .. _____ .0.917 
July _______________ ..... ______ ._ 0.749 
Aug ............................. 0 Sept. . _______ . __ . ________________ 0.140 
Oct. _________ . ____ ..... __ ._. ______ 1. 0:16 
Nov. .. .... _. __ . _____________ .. _ ... 1. 4 2 8 
Dec. _______ ._. __ ._ .......... ______ 0.364 











































a Unpublished data from Ross Baumann, Delmrtment of Economics and 
Sociology. Iowa. State University, Ames. Iowa. The monthly coefficients 
do not include labor for fertilizing. For fertilization: add 0.1 hour pcr 
aCre in May and June for corn; add 0.3 hour per acre in April for 
cats: and add 0.2 hour per acre in May f(·r soybe"ns. These coeffi-
cients have been assumed to remain unchanrred during the period con .. 
sid~rcd in the analysls. 
h Assumes all hay harvested and yield of 2.5 tons per acre. 
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TABLE B-2, COSTS PER ACRE FOR CORN. YEARS 1951-55, DOLLARS.-
'Items Units 1951 1952 195)J 1964 1955 
Tractor overhead ... .-...... _ .... _............................................................. $/ao. 2.60 2.60 2.63 2.66 2.68 
Tractor operating .............................................................................. $/ac. 2.92 2.92 2.97 3.01 3.06 
Machinery overhead .......................................... ,.............................. $/ac. 6.23 6.23 6.30 6.45 6.61 
Seed ...... ,........................................................................................... $/ac. 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Building repair ................................................................................ $/ac. 2.99 2.99 3.01) 3.02 3.02 
Total constant cost ................................. , ....................................... $/I1c. 16.74 16.74 16.90 17.14 17.37 
~H~a~rv~e=st~in~g~.= ..  .. = ..= ...= .. = .. = ...= ..= .. = ..= ...= ..= .. = ..~...= .. = ..= ..='.. = .. = ..= ... = ..= ..= ..= ... = ..= ..= ..= ..~...= .. = ..= .. ~...= .. = ..= ... =.~$~/b~u~. ______ ~~0.=O~6 ________ ~O~.O~7 ________ ~0~.0~7~ ______ ~O~.0~8~ ______ 0.13 
.3 These costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate corn with the average technique used in the area. Fertiliza-
tion ccsts are not included; they can be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in table 2 in the text by the fertilizer prices. With 
the addition of the ferti!izing expense, the items composing the capital coefficient for corn are complete. These data are adapted from Bowlen. 
B. and Heady. E. O. Optimum combinations of competitive crops at particular locations. (Application of linear programming: 1) Iowa Agr. E,,<P. 
Sta. Res. Bu!. 4~6. 1955, 
TABLE B-3. COSTS PER ACRE FOR OATS. YEARS 
Items Units 1951 
Tractor overhead ................ __ .... __ ......... __ .............................. __ ........ .. 
Tractor operating . ____ ........... __ .04 .. ___ ••• _ •. ____ . __ .... __ .. _ •. _ .•.••. ____ .. __ ....•.•• ___ • 




Seed ... __ ............ __ ......... ____ . __ ................... ____ ........ __ ..... ' .. __ ... ______ .. __ ' ..... . 
Building repair .... __ . ____ . __ .................. __ ....................... __________ . __ .......... .. 
$/ae. 1.86 
$/ac. 2.4:1 
Total constant cost . ____ .............. ____ .. __ . __ ..................... ____ .................. . $/ac. 12.60 
Harvesting ____ .. ___ ............ __ ..... __ ..... ________ . ___ . ____ ......... __ ..... __ .. _. __ .... ___ ... . $/bu. 0.04 
1951-55, DOLLARS.' 
1902 1953 























Il Thetse costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate onts with the average technique used in the area. Fertilization 
costs are not included; they cnn be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in table 2 in the text by the fertilizer prices. With the ad-
dition of the fertilizing expense, the items composing the capital coeffic:ent for oats are complete. These data are adapted from Bowlen and 
Heady, ibid. 
TABLE B·4. COSTS PER ACRE FOR SOYBEANS. YEARS 
!terns 
l 1ractor overhead _ ... ~ ..... __ ., .. __ ._ .. __ .... ___ . _____ ...... _. ____ .. ___ .......... __ ..... _ .. _ .. . 
Tractor operating .................. ______ ... __ ......... ____________ , ....................... . 
Machinery overhead .............. __ ............... , ...... , ... __ ............. ____ ........ __ . 
Seed ......................... __ ....... , __ .. __ .... ____ ...... __ .. __ ................. __ ................ .. 
Building repair ................. ' ......... __ .... , ........ __ .................. , .. __ ........... . 
Total constant cost ..... ______ .. __ ........................................ __ ..... __ ...... __ .. 

























1953 1954 1955 
2.62 ~.65 2.67 
2.86 2.88 3.00 
5.40 5.55 5.65 
4.30 4.45 4.63 
1.55 1.55 1.56 
16.73 17.08 17.51 
0.04 0.05 0.08 
a These costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate soybeans with the average technique used in the area. Fertiliza-
tion costs are not included; they can be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in table 2 in the text by tbe fertilizer prices. With the 
addition of the fertilization expense, the items composing the capital coefficient for soybeans arc complete. These data are adapted from Bowlen and 
Heady, ibid. 
TABLE B-5. COSTS PER ACRE FOR MEADOW. YEARS 1951-fi5, DOLLARS.-
Items UnIts 1~~1 1H52 1953 
1.~ractor overhead ........... ______ . __ . ____ ... ___ ....... ___ .... ____ ...... H. _____ • ___ ••• __ •••••• $/ao. 2.60 2.60 2.6:; 
Tractor operating ______ ............. __ .. __ ........ __ ... __ ., .. __ .......... , ....... __ ......... . 
Machinery overhead ......... __ .. __ ........................................ __ ... , ........... . 
Seed __ ...................................................... , ................................ , ....... . 
Building repair ...... ____ .. __ ........... , .. ____ .............. __ .. __ .. ______ ................ .. 
Total constant cost __ ............ __ .. ____ ........................ ____ ........ ____ ......... .. 
Harvesting ... _ ................ u. __ •.•.•.• __ •••• __ ••. ___ ••.•.. __ ••• H. ___ •.••••••••••• ________ •• 
$/ao. 2.99 ~.99 3.05 
$/01c. 4.84 4.84 4.90 
$/ac. 1.08 4.56 ,1.62 
$/ac, 2.8:! 2.83 2.83 
$/01c. 17.:l1 17.82 18.03 

















a. These costs are estimates of those expenses norll1alIy required to seed and cllltiv'1te an alfalfa-red clover-timothy meadow with the average tech-
niqu~ ured in the areu. Fertilization costs are not included; they can be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in table 2 in the text 
by the fertilizer prices. The harvesting cost is not included in the capital co.ffic'ent of the rotations but it is charged to the livestock enterprises 
under tb~ assumption that in the eventual absence of livestock the hay would not b. hanested. These data are adapted from Bowlen and Heady, 
ibid. 
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APPENDIX C: INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
The input-output data for the livestock enter-
prises considered in this study are presented in 
tables C-l and C-2. With the exception of the 
capital coefficients, the input requirements have 
been assumed to remain unchanged during the 
period under analysis. . 
The data presented in tables C-l and C-2 refer 
to the enterprises produced under a situation of 
owner-opel'atorship. In a crop-share-cash lease, 
the cash rent which is paid on meadow and per-
manent pasture would be added to the capital 
coefficients. 
TABLE C-l. INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR SPRING HOG ENTERPRISE, 1951-55. ON A LITTER BASIS.' 
Items Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Operating capitalb .................................................................. dollars 159.18 160.85 162.60 161.67 159.90 
Housing ......................................................................................... sq . ft. 70.40 70.40 70.40 70.40 70.40 
Labor ... --....... -_ ..................... __ ._ ........... __ ....... _--............. _ ............ man-hours 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 
Jan . ...... _ ........................ _ ................. __ •••••••• u .. •• ...... u •••••• man-hours 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 
~'eb. 
...... • .. • ...... ·.·.··.·.····._ •• •• .... •• ........... _ ... u ............. _ ............ man-hours 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 
March ......................................................................................... man-hours 7.02 7.112 7.02 7.02 7.02 
April ........................ ~ ........................................... -....... ~ ....... - man-hours 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
May ............................................... _ ............. --....... _ .... _ ..... _-...... -.-.... -.- man-hours 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
June .. -........... ----......... _-.... -..................................... _ ............. man-hour. 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 
July ••• _ ................................................................ • •• • ............ u ....... man-hours 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.10 2.16 
Aug . ................. _ ........................................................ _ ..... _ .. man-hours 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 
SePt . .............................................. _ ....... _ .... _ .... _ ............... _ ................... man.hours 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 
Oct. .................................................... _ ......................................... man-hours 1.48 lAI; 1.48 1.48 1.48 
Nov. ........... _ ............ _ ........... _ ....... __ ........... -......•. -._ ................. man-hours 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 
Dee • ............... _ ........................................................................... man-hours 1.69 1.6t1 1.69 1.69 1.69 
Hny ......... _ .................................................................................................... tons 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Corn lind equivalent ................................................................................ bushels 125.85 125.85 125.85 125.85 125.85 
• The dllta have been obtained from the records of the Farm Business Asssociation for the selected farm in Hamilton County. The labor coefficients 
are those adapted by Mackie, A. B. et al., up. cit. The data refer to the enterprise prodUCed undor " situation of owner-operatorship; under ten-
ancy the quota of cash rent paid on hay is added to the capital coefficient. 
b The items composing the capital eXIJenSe are: protein, power. equipment, miscellaneous. 
TABLE C-~. INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR PASTURE-FED CALVES ENTERl'RISE, 1951-55, ON A HEAl) BASIS.-
ltems Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Operating capital" .................................... ~ ................................... dollars 106.77 120.26 131. 74 116.76 120.41 
Lahor ........................................................................................................ man-hours 
Jan. ....... -.......................................................................... man-hours 1.08 1.08 1.U8 1.08 1.08 
~eb. ................................. -................................. -....... _ ........ man-hour. 1.06 1.06 l.06 1.06 1.06 
March ........ --.... -_ ... __ .......................... -.........• -............. man-hours 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
AlJril ........................................................................... man-hours 1.49 1.4t1 1.49 1.49 1.49 
May ......... -.................... __ ... __ .. _ .. _ .... _ .. _ ..•••..•............ _ .... man-hour. 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
June .............................................. _ ... -........ -................. man-hours 2.42 2.42 :::.4~ 2.42 2.42 
July 
................ u.· .. •••••••••••••••• .. •••••••••••••••••••• .................... man-hours 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
Aug. ............................ u . ................ -.. -............................ man-hours 2.42 2.42 2.4Z 2.42 2.42 
~el~t • .................................................................................. man-hours 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Uct. -...... --... -.--.~ ............................................................ man-hours 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
.(\joV • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ .. _ .............. u .................... _ ....... __ .... man-hours 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 LOG 
Dec . ........................ -... _ ...... __ ... -.. _ .. -....... --.. _ ... _-_ .... _ .. -... man-hours 1.08 I.U8 1.08 1.08 1.08 
Hay ._ ..................... -... _._ ................................................................. tons 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 
Corn and equivnlent. ......................................................... bushels 50 50 50 50 50 
• The data have been obtmned from the records of the Farm Business Association for the Relected farm In Hamilton COllnty. The labor coefficients 
arc those adRpted by Mackie, A. B. et al., ibid. The d,!ta refer .t'! the enterprise produced under a situation (}f ownel'-operatorship; lIntler tenancy 
the quota of cash rent paitl on hay is added to the call1tai coeff,c,ent. 
D The items composing the capital expense Rle: I)rotein, power, equipment, miscellaneous, reeder stock and hay harvesting cost. 
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APPENDIX D: PRICES USED IN. PROGRAMMING 
The prices of the crops and livestock enter-
prises used in programming are presented in 
table D-l. ' 
It is assumed that the price expectation models 
do not vary in the alternative tenure situations 
considered. The prices of crops correspond to 
the arithmetic mean of the prices occurred in the 
previous 10 years, while the length of time as-
sumed for the expected prices of livestock is 5 
years. 
TABLE D.l. PRICES OF CROPS AND LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES USED IN PROGRAMMING. 1951·55. 
Items Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Crops: 
Corn ................................................................................ dollars/bu. 1.08 1.19 1.26 1.30 1.35 
Oats ................................................................................ dollars/bu. 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.78 
Soybeans ........................................................................ dollars/bu. 2.29 2.36 2.47 2.56 2.60 
Livestock: 
Butcher hogs .................................................................. dollars/cwt. 18.93 19.52 18.12 17.62 18.68 
Sows .................................. _ .................................. _...... dollars/cwt. 16.93 17.52 16.12 15.62 16.68 
Calves .......................................................... _._............. dollars/cwt. 16.90 20.44 22.85 82.98 22.76 
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